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Municipal Debt Management and Bankruptcy Intervention in Hungary 1995-2002:  Policy
Suggestions for Russian Federation Legislation
Introduction
Debt-induced temporary insolvency occurs in those systems of sub-national finance where
the State allows borrowing to take place to fund municipal tasks that otherwise would not be
performed by another level of government.  Debt-induced insolvency is possible when a system of
preventive mechanisms is either not in place, or is not monitored closely either by the State or by an
independent systems of controls at the local government level.  In states where infrastructure
responsibilities are allocated to regional self-governments, or where specialized institutions provide
financing, or where the State itself guarantees the debt of local government, municipal insolvency
caused by debt payments is rare or non-existent.  
Thus debt-induced insolvency can take place in those systems where local governments are
small, their service areas are consequently small, and their fiscal and performance responsibilities
high.  This is the case in Hungary, where the smallest villages to the capital city have essentially the
same responsibilities for providing environmental infrastructure.  Since the grant system does not
provide 100% coverage of capital costs, and the EU requires co-financing, the need to borrow is
evident.  In local government systems with more generous grant programs, larger service areas, and
“higher level” responsibility for environmental infrastructure, sub-national borrowing is either not
allowed, or does not need to take place.   
The purpose of this study is NOT to address a problem prevalent in many Central European
transition countries, namely, the “unpaid bills” or persistent operational deficits situation.  Hungary
and Bulgaria, in particular, have fiscal transfer systems that do not provide enough cash flow to the
smallest municipalities who year after year face operating deficits in trying to provide mandatory
services.  Ideally, the local government law and constitution provide protection against such
situations but in reality 1/3 of Hungary’s 3,200 independent and equal municipalities face
operational deficits on a yearly basis, caused entirely by an inadequately designed transfer system
and an inability to take advantage of local tax sources.  In the cases examined below, and the Debt
Adjustment Law to be described, it is not the operational deficit that caused insolvency, rather the
inability to make debt payments to lenders or to contractors on capital projects.  Villages with
operational deficits who cannot even perform their mandatory functions should, and do not, borrow.
The persistent operational deficit problem is thus a separate issue and will only be dealt with in
passing.  
Municipal systems in the OECD states have instituted a variety of mechanisms to prohibit,
control and prevent municipal defaults on both domestic and foreign debt.  IMF conditionalities,
and the need to apply consolidated public accounting in the EU member-nominees, have also
convinced national regulators to treat municipal debt as a part of overall public debt, even in
situations where the state explicitly does not guarantee sub-sovereign debt.  Municipal insolvency
caused by missed debt payments or excessive capital spending is not a problem in most OECD
countries.  To the best of our knowledge, only Hungary has prepared a municipal debt adjustment
(bankruptcy) law that is carried out through the court system, since the fiscal transfer systems are
still buoyant in other similar states like the Czech Republic and Poland.  Or, conversely,
municipalities are strictly regulated as in Austria, Germany, France and Britain, where regional
governments assume roles that are taken by the lowest level in the three Central European states.
Switzerland, Latvia and the German federal states have intervention mechanisms carried out by the
executive branch, i.e. by a ministry or level of executive power one level above that of the affected
municipality.  These interventions can be initiated by the next level of government and in no way
encourage a voluntary agreement of the creditors and debtor.  Instead, these procedures focus on
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creating emergency budgets and restoring the fiscal balance at the local level.  The question of
accumulated debt is not significant given heavy-handed regulation by the higher levels prior to
borrowing in those countries.  By Hungarian standards intervention by supervisory and supreme
organs of the State, not by an independent judiciary, seem to violate the principles of self-
government and subsidiarity.  But Hungary is an extreme case.  In other former socialist states like
Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, municipal borrowing is strictly regulated, and important projects
funded by international lenders all require a sovereign guarantee.  Furthermore, specialized lending
institutions as they exist in France and Germany have unique advantages over banks, and end up
lending funds with very low risk to only projects that are not only environmentally feasible but can
also generate “fee based” cash flows.  This is unfortunately not yet possible in most of the ex-
socialist states where the cost of capital and environmental services is at world prices, but users
cannot afford all costs, including capital financing, operational expenses and amortization.
Statement of Problem
Why this law in Hungary?  Hungary’s Local Government Law, in effect since 1990,
allocates great responsibilities to local governments regardless of size with respect to public
services.  These responsibilities are matched with the authorization to conduct for profit businesses,
to own and manage commercial property, to own and manage portfolios of securities, and to borrow
for capital investment projects, freely, without any need for approval from or registration with a
higher level of government.  Hence Hungarian local governments were free to borrow for capital
investment purposes from domestic and foreign banks, and to issue bonds, at whatever terms and in
currencies the two parties found acceptable.  Given the freedom to operate businesses and to
conduct for profit operations, the assumption was that profits from these operations could be used to
finance debt to build infrastructure in the environmental, health and other infrastructure fields.
With the advent of the 1990 Local Government Law, Hungary’s 3,100 plus local governments
became independent entities subject only to the supervision of Parliament, with no intermediate
layer of government or administration (counties, districts etc) to approve, intervene or monitor their
activities.  Given virtually unlimited freedom to manage assets and to conduct business, local
government operational budgets and mandated activities could be threatened if the proper prudence
and experience were absent.  Any proposal to monitor or control local government activity by the
central government was hence viewed with suspicion.  For these reasons, as well as fiscal stress at
the national level, several local governments borrowed too much for non-mandatory purposes that
by the end of 1994 the central government had to consider methods to reign in irresponsible
borrowing and activities at the local level.
Situation in early 1995.  Besides budgeting for the 25 basic, and several hundred subsidiary
tasks that local governments must perform by law, municipalities began to borrow funds for profit-
seeking activities, endangering mandatory tasks and solvency in many cases.  Borrowing in some
cases exceeded the total budgets of smaller municipalities, and the economic viability of non-
mandatory infrastructure was also questionable.  Given the unfettered freedom of local governments
to manage their assets and budgets (within the constraints of shared taxes, transfer payments and
local tax capacity) the central government faced the possibility of having hundreds of cases of
contingent liabilities and the risk of having to directly carry out mandatory local tasks if local
governments failed.  
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Municipal Borrowing Restrictions in Place 1990-March, 1995
-No absolute nor formulaic limit on local government borrowing within one budget year or on a multi-year basis
-Central government shared revenue, transfer payments, normative grants, infrastructure grants cannot be used for loan
repayment (implicitly the central government would not finance a local government’s debt)
-Local government may borrow for whatever purpose at whatever terms the city council approved in a local resolution
-Local Government Act (1990) states that the central government will not assume responsibility for local debt
By 1995, Hungary’s trade, budget and current accounts deficit placed such pressure on the
government, that in March it enacted a serious of fiscal restrictions known in the popular parlance
as the “Bokros package.”  Combining a one-off devaluation with a commitment to predetermined
crawling peg devaluation, and a host of real cutbacks in spending and other restrictions, the
situation of indebted local governments became more serious.  By the end of 1995, several local
governments lobbied for, and received one-time grants from the central government’s general
reserves to resolve insolvency caused by mismanagement and excessive debt.1  The availability and
disbursement of funds to five municipalities in distress due to irresponsible and excessive
borrowing for non-mandatory purposes threatened to establish a bad precedent, and immeasurable
contingent liabilities for the central government.  The eventual repayment of these temporary bridge
grants to the Central Government was to be addressed in a future debt adjustment law where the
central government would assume the role of a creditor.  Given that the International Monetary
Fund and other international organizations wished to make the entire state budget as transparent and
unequivocal as possible, negating contingent or implicit state liabilities became a policy goal.  In
this climate, the issue of municipal insolvency or perhaps bankruptcy became unavoidable within
the policy-making ministries, i.e. Interior and Finance.
The restrictions cited above were not adequate to withstand the political pressure on the
government to assist potentially insolvent local governments who through poor investment
decisions were endangering the provision of mandatory public services.  Though municipalities
receiving these emergency funds were restricted to performing a short list of mandatory tasks2, the
precedent of central funds being available after all posed a real danger for the state budget and gave
no incentive to the local level to make more reasonable investment decisions.  The availability of
these “soft funds” also reduced some of the risks lenders faced and encouraged them to continue to
lobby for such bailouts in the future.  In 1995, municipalities began to borrow long term to finance
short term operating deficits, and other capital borrowing was largely to finance investments in non-
mandatory infrastructure, i.e. in activities that were voluntarily assumed, not mandated by the state.
Some localities began to make late payments, i.e. in technical terms defaulted, and both creditors
and debtors began to lobby for wide-scale bailouts.3  The essential question of maintaining and
protecting public services while securing the rights of creditors went unanswered.  Hungary’s
corporate bankruptcy law, in force since the late 1980s, was not entirely applicable to borrowers
who could not be liquidated without the state taking over their duties.  Furthermore, each citizen has
a constitutional right to representation at the local level, so local government cannot be liquidated
like a commercial code enterprise.  Without the political will or ability to tightly control local
                                                          
1 Government Decision 1092/1995 (IX.28) transferred funds to cover a portion of the expenses of municipalities in distress due to their own fault.
These communities included:  Bakonszeg, Nágocs, Bátorliget, Szerencs and Páty, all of which (except Szerencs) eventually underwent a debt
adjustment process.
2 These eight tasks applied to the 5 communities receiving emergency funds:  primary schools, educational facilities, and where appropriate, facilities
for ethnic minorities; social welfare; education for children undergoing health treatment, facilities for physically and mentally handicapped children;
public lighting; public cemeteries;  operating the mayor’s office, the town hall, and conducting local and state administration tasks as called for by the
law;  where appropriate, operating the local fire department and ambulance service. (annex to Government Decision 1092/1995 (IX. 28).  Note that
drinking water and sanitation service were exempted temporarily.
3 The authors were members of an informal working group on municipal finance where representatives of several commercial banks explicitly stated
that these loans were in essence for the public benefit, and hence deserved bailouts by the state.  Representatives of the ministries responded that loans
entail risk since Hungary was already a market economy.
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government borrowing and business practices by constitutional and legislative fiat, the Hungarian
government decided to propose a municipal debt adjustment law that would be invoked if prudence
and other preemptive measures failed.  
The Municipal Debt Adjustment Law was approved by the Hungarian Parliament on March
26, 1996, by an 84% to 16% margin.4  The law went into effect in June 1996.  Since then, only 18
municipalities have filed for debt adjustment (two of them twice), and the last debt adjustment
process was initiated in 2001.  Contrary to expectations among experts and in the press during the
period of fiscal restrictions enacted in 1995 and 1996, only a handful of municipalities filed for
protection, and creditors initiated none of the proceedings.  The law was able to preempt additional
filings as both creditors and debtors were encouraged to seek redress outside of the court system,
and to take other steps to ensure solvency and operational efficiency.  In essence the law is
successful since within the overall legal framework and capital market, municipalities stopped
borrowing in excess of their capacity to service debt.5  
The initiation of the debt adjustment act in 1995 and its coming into force in June, 1996,
must be viewed in the context of declining real resource transfers to the local government sector,
the privatization of the economy, and the stated goal of successive governments to rationalize local
government services without changes in the constitutional framework.  Instead of revamping task
allocation due to political obstacles, Hungary’s approach has been to regulate where possible and to
allow market actors to assume risk.  
The Essence of Debt Controls
Methods used in Western Europe to deal with municipalities with financial difficulties:  debt
payment problems and operational deficits6
Persistent operational deficits, “unpaid bills” and accumulated accounts payable problems
are observable in both the mature market economies of the OECD countries, as well in many of
transition economies.  National governments have devised many schemes to overcome temporary
deficits caused by natural disasters, changes in economic policies and other “one time” events.
What is less common is that operational deficits persist year after year on the local level with
unconditional deficit grants made by the central government year after year.  Persistent operational
deficits and unpaid bills are symptomatic of fiscal imbalance in terms of both revenue and task
allocation.  
What is common to all countries in which the local governments sometimes face operational
deficits is that national government schemes distinguish between deficits caused by excessive
borrowing and between the inability to fund current operations.  A less clear situation exists when
accumulated unpaid bills are converted to debt through contractual mechanisms, or by court
decisions.  There is a common dilemma of financial assistance by the State to local authorities:  it is
individually rational for a single local authority to maximize the assistance it receives, while
                                                          
4 Cited as Law XXV of 1996.   The official Hungarian version was published in the Magyar Közlöny (number 28, April 12, 1996)
5 See the following for details on fiscal restrictions, grant flows and other framework legislation, see World Bank Discussion Paper No. 417,
“Hungary:  Modernizing the Subnational Government System,”  May, 2000, Mihaly Kopanyi et al editors.
6 Sources of information used:
“The risks arising from Local Authorities Financial Obligations,” Draft Report by the Steering Committee on Local and Regional
Democracy, no. 76, Council of Europe Publishing, August, 2002;
“Recovery of Local and Regional Authorities in Financial Difficulties,” Local and regional authorities in Europe, no. 77, Council of
Europe Publishing, August, 2002;
Bernard Dafflon, editor, Local Public Finance in Europe:  Balancing the Budget and Controlling Debt, Cheltenham, UK:  Edward Elgar
Publishing, 2002.
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collectively too much assistance would undermine local autonomy.  From the State or higher level
of government perspective, the problem is to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cases.  
The need to distinguish between “innocent” financial stress caused by prudent decisions in
an uncertain environment, and “bad” decisions concerning current spending or debt is critical in
developing both the deficits grants policy of Russia and in devising a scheme to deal with
municipalities in fiscal stress caused by both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” debt.  In both cases,
the State and municipalities have to take responsibility for the resources and decisions that they do
indeed control.  
Concerning Russia’s significant problem with persistent unpaid bills or accumulated
accounts payable that through certain mechanisms is, or will be converted to debt, we suggest that
the Council of Europe’s recommendations be taken seriously:
Examples of extraordinary assistance granted in surveyed countries:
Belgium:  Belgium is a federal state with a balanced budget requirement for local
authorities.  One of the regions created a fund to provide loans to municipalities that could not
balance their budgets.  These loans were granted only after approval of a recovery plan, and a
regional inspector was sent to the municipality to monitor its financial performance.  
Bulgaria:  Deficit grants require significant restructuring of local services, privatization, and
the increase of local taxes and fees.  
France:  France has a very strict system of deficit grants that are only provided in the case of
unfunded or under funded mandates, or in other situations that are not the fault of the local
authority.  These grants cannot be used to fund capital investment programs, and are not considered
to be deficit subsidies rather a source of funds to start a recovery plan.  In 2000, only 5 French local
authorities received such assistance.  (natural disasters are an exception).
Germany:  Each state has a controlling authority that approves annual budgets for
municipalities.  Deficits are only allowed in extraordinary cases, with grants from the federal states
repayable within two years.
Poland:  Grants exist to recover from severe flood damage with strict criteria applied to
documenting physical destruction.
COE Recommendations (No. 96-3) “on local authorities budgetary deficits and excessive
indebtedness”
If discretionary power of the central or regional government is high, then it may have
credibility problems if it makes arbitrary decisions.
-need clear and widely accepted definition of what constitutes financial difficulty
-need to define legitimate reasons for financial assistance by law
-other means should be put in place before financial assistance is attempted (recovery plans)
-central assistance should be matched by significant financial effort on the local level
-central government should not guarantee local loans (except certain developmental loans)
-the consequences of “illegitimate” financial difficulties among local authorities should be
made clear, for example, in a municipal bankruptcy code
-strong local tax and revenue systems are an alternative to central assistance
-balanced budget requirements tend to work well
-central government should not explicitly nor implicitly guarantee loans of local authorities
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Debt control mechanisms in effect in Europe:
Most OECD and Council of Europe (COE) member states allow local borrowing for capital
investment purposes but require liquidity loans to be paid back within the year.  Only a few
countries use stock-based municipal borrowing limits, even when the total stock of municipal debt
is counted against the Maastricht criteria.  Examples of these restrictions include:
Restrictions on volume of borrowing and debt service ratios:
UK:  Credit approval ceilings are given each year by the government, the government
defines a maximum borrowing amount.  All sources of repayment are directly or indirectly
controlled by the central government.  Even the level of local capital spending is “suggested” by the
appropriate ministry.
Denmark:  No municipal borrowing is allowed at all with a few exceptions.  Municipalities
must finance all of their expenses, including capital expenses, through current revenues.  Budgets
must be balanced.  Automatic permission is granted for fee-based borrowing for public utilities and
other priority investments in social welfare facilities, energy conservation etc.  In certain economic
situations, the Interior Ministry gives permission for discretionary borrowing to stimulate local
economies, sets borrowing limits for real estate and fee-supported infrastructure borrowing on an
annual basis.
Germany:  Each Bundesland has its own volume of borrowing limits and explicit approval is
needed from the Land.  Most commonly used are the projected operational surpluses that are to
exceed projected capital expenses, including a mandatory “transfer” from the current account to the
capital account.
Poland and Czech Republic:  15% of current revenues may be used to fund debt service.
Croatia:  20% of own resources may be used for debt service and the MOF needs to approve
each loan.
Ireland:  Each municipal borrowing must be approved by the Minister who determines
whether they need the loan and whether they can pay it back
Austria:  Each Land has a different set of criteria for debt needing higher-level approval, and
differing absolute or relative limits
Spain:  The current account surplus may be used to finance the capital account with the
Finance Ministry’s approval.  Total municipal debt may not exceed 110% of annual revenues.
Norway:  Borrowing is allowed for investment only.  The current budget may have
amortization expenses equal to the annual cost of interest and capital payments.
France:  Operational surpluses and savings from prior years must exceed the annual burden
of capital repayment.  No other restrictions apply.
Italy:  Municipalities must have balanced capital and current accounts.  Interest payments
may not exceed 25% of current revenues.  Loans must have terms of at least 10 years.  The State
Treasury sets the maximum legal interest rate.  
Restrictions on municipal guarantees:
Guarantees to third parties are allowed and not counted against debt limits:  UK, Sweden,
Czech Republic, and Finland.
Municipal guarantees are restricted to public purpose organizations, non-profit
organizations, communal enterprises, or enterprises and institutions with municipal majority
ownership:  Belgium, Norway, Denmark, and Croatia.
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Guarantees to third parties are counted as municipal debt and included in the limits on debt
volumes:  Croatia, Denmark, France, and Austria.
Restrictions on collateral:
UK:  no municipal asset may be used to guarantee debt, only cash flow.
Property may be used to guarantee municipal loans:  Ireland, Norway, Finland, and
Denmark. (By Bundesland permission only in Germany, assets may only be purchased for public
purposes, and sold only if they do not serve a public purpose).
Public sector assets may not be used as collateral:  Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, and
Portugal.
No restrictions on the use of municipal assets as collateral:  Czech Republic, Poland, and
Croatia.
“Bankruptcy” or debt adjustment elsewhere
Of 27 COE member states, only 5 have some type of procedure similar to bankruptcy
adjustment.  Only two, Hungary and Latvia, have actual legislation on file.   In 22 COE members it
is legally impossible to have a bankruptcy on the local level.   There are functional equivalents to
bankruptcy procedures in Switzerland, some German states and UK, i.e. administrators or trustees
may be appointed to oversee reorganization and repayment plan (do not provide “protection” from
all creditors).  In other transition countries such as Poland and Czech Republic, local governments
are able to run budget surpluses to fund capital investment and borrowing, so far.  The Czech and
Polish governments have ignored the possibility of debt adjustment, and conflicts with banks and
bondholders have been handled based on loan agreements, contracts and civil law.  The
Government of Estonia is considering a debt adjustment procedure of some type based upon the
Hungarian model.
Controls in Hungary
In contrast to the West European models outlined above, Hungary’s debt adjustment law
operates in the context of several important rules and laws that regulate the economic and budgetary
functions of local self-government.  These controls emerged over the 1990-2002 period, but most of
them are found in basic laws and were in effect in some form throughout this period.
The Law on Local Self-Government designates the local assembly as being responsible for
the stability of the local budget and economic activities.  The mayor is responsible for the legality of
municipal decisions.  But neither the local assembly nor the mayor can in effect be held responsible
personally or collectively for bad decisions.  There are neither personal nor collective sanctions for
irresponsible management.  The local assembly may set a borrowing policy that is in compliance
with the law (detailed elsewhere).  The assembly can authorize the finance committee and the
mayor to conduct negotiations with lenders on behalf of the municipality without any requirement
for public hearings, approval or information on the purpose of the borrowing and its details.  Often
such information is labeled as constituting business secrets.  There is also no formal, operative or
logical link between assumed debt and the need to raise taxes and local fees (that are legally
available for debt service, most shared revenues and transfer payments are off-limits).  The law
defines “debt” as borrowing or given guarantees.  But there were several cases where debts were
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owed to vendors, and these were not formally loans.  Vendors often disguise their deferred payment
plans that are really loans.  The bookkeeping and accounting system cannot handle hidden debt like
this, nor can it demonstrate contingent liabilities, nor place a probable value on balloon debt
payments in current money terms (net present value).  Municipalities went around “debt” payment
limits by issuing purchase orders to vendors, who expected deferred payment, and hid interest costs
in the price of the goods and services to be sold.  
Certain types of municipal property in Hungary are not available as collateral, and cannot be
sold by municipalities.  These include all properties used to deliver mandatory services, for example
schools, historical monuments, parks, and streets.  This “core property,” normative state grants, the
personal income tax and other shared taxes are not available for debt payment or guarantees.
Before 1995, banks simply seized money transfers from the Treasury until the Finance Ministry
issued decrees that banned the seizing of municipal funds from a variety sources.  These seizures
often endangered mandatory functions.  Restricting the types of assets and revenues that are
available for debt service is a very effective form of debt control, provided that the bookkeeping
and accounting system can segregate funds by source, and up to date information is always
available. (The debt service limit formula is detailed elsewhere in this study).  Internal controlling is
required by law where the local government controls the financial activities of its institutions and
agencies.  The State Audit Office oversees the use of public funds, but does very few full audits per
year and is not enough to truly prevent fraud, waste and abuse.  External audits of municipal
financial statements are required above a certain budgetary size, or if a municipality engages in
borrowing.  These “audits” are actually compliance audits and seem to be only a formal review of
formats and do not investigate the efficiency of the municipalities’ use of funds.
Maintaining essential public services, protecting debtors, creditors, and the state budget,
while making it entirely clear what would happen in the case of municipal default, formed the main
justification for creating a debt adjustment law.  Instead of tight regulations in use throughout
Europe (and North America), the Hungarian government decided that both lenders and borrowers
should be held responsible for their decisions, while the government put in place mechanisms for
ultimately protecting mandatory services.  
Stress on municipal budgets.  In 1994, nearly 5 years into the post-Communist local
government system, several factors placed severe stress on operating budgets of municipalities of
all sizes.  While local governments depended largely on transfer payments and shared taxes for their
operations, each has significant taxing powers and the ability to earn portfolio income on assets,
both of which qualify as own-source revenue.  These own source revenues are used to cover the gap
between the actual cost of operating mandatory services and the normative and other transfers
provided by the central government.  Borrowing or capital projects of any type are financed in part
from own revenues, either taxes or from the management of real and financial portfolios.  Local
taxes of all types became more widespread in the 1990s since several central government assistance
grants to distressed local governments applied a standard that certain funds needed to be raised via
local taxes.  Besides local taxes, significant income could be generated from the multitude of real
estate, shares, treasury bills, and other securities transferred to the local government sector in the
early 1990s.  These assets were sold off during the early 1990s to finance operational deficits and to
fund investment projects, not all of which supported mandatory public services.  The assets and
taxing powers of Hungarian local governments vary widely, but despite this variation many of the
poorest communities assumed voluntary tasks and engaged in business activities that were far in
excess of their taxing and fiscal capacities (and the needs of the population).  Larger villages, and
smaller cities, that are those between 5,000 and 20,000 in population, were the most endangered
through excess borrowing and the withering of assets for consumption and non-mandatory
investments.  These same communities were less likely to form notary districts and associations
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with neighboring villages to share the burden of providing services, since each insisted on an
independent administrative staff and set of institutions, despite an inability to finance them.  Banks
in the 1990-1995 period considered local governments to be good borrowers since through control
of their current accounts they could debit interest and principal payments, and the implicit role of
the state further reduced their perceived risk.  (Despite the low risk, some banks charged interest
rate premiums of several hundred basis points over the sovereign).  In sum, borrowing in excess of
financial capacity, declining free cash flow, reduced assets, excessive voluntary services etc. led to
the use of borrowing to fund short-term operational deficits that were rolled over (illegally) from
one budget to the next by the mid 1990s.
Despite the existence of restrictions on borrowing and other preventive rules, municipalities
in the early 1990s were able to borrowing to fund operational deficits, essentially an illegal act.  The
also sold their real estate and financial assets at low prices to pay debts or to finance operations.
Accounting was not always accurate and realistic.  Furthermore, municipalities misunderstood the
risk of providing guarantees to for-profit businesses or to their own institutions.  The finance
committees of local assemblies did not take their work too seriously, and ignored the repeated
warnings of the internal controllers and independent auditors.  In short, there is no sanction if an
assembly ignores the reports of auditors and controllers!
In mid 1994 local governments had long-term debts of 53 billion HUF, while in 1996
short-term operational loans amounted to 42 billion forints, with loans for investment
projects amounting to only 14 billion forints.  While asset sales were used to pay
interest and principal, and competing banks offered to refinance these loans, this trend
was clearly not viable since long-term funds should not be used for funding operational
deficits.  Cash management was not an issue as long as debt payments were being made.
Loans were also used as matching grants for obtaining central government funds for
infrastructure such as water, wastewater and solid waste facilities.  Loans qualified as
“own source” contributions; hence municipalities were reluctant to cease borrowing
since a multitude of free funds would be lost.  Instead, assets that were negotiable and
had a market price were sold off, including not only real estate but also portfolios of
stocks, bonds and ownership shares.  These sales were not always at optimal prices, thus
localities made balance sheet losses while trying to pay back loans that were largely
used to fund operational deficits.  
Purposes of the Debt Adjustment Law
In the course of the debate surrounding the creation of the debt adjustment law,
policymakers in the Finance and Interior Ministries, as well as some experts appointed to perfect the
proposal (including practicing commercial bankruptcy trustees and judges, as well as volunteer
foreign experts in municipal finance) concluded that if the State is not willing to administratively or
legislatively control the risks of municipal borrowing, then an unambiguous law would need to
serve the following purposes:  a)  prevent and preempt municipal defaults with respect to any
lender, bondholder or vendor;  b) provide clear administrative and legal procedure for affected
creditors to follow;  c) provide reorganization and workout procedures;  d) make certain that the
national government will not guarantee local borrowings as sovereign guarantees need an act of
parliament and specific authorization in the annual budget;  d) maintain public services; e) allow for
expansion of borrowing as local taxes and revenues increase.  Municipal debt adjustment, combined
with preemptive reorganization, budget cutbacks and some emergency funding from the state, were
seen as methods of discouraging irresponsible borrowing.
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Risks associated with municipal defaults and financial stress
Borrower/Local Government
• Inability to make timely payment, penalties and sanctions imposed
• Strain on operational budget
• Halted or partially finished investment projects don’t pay returns
• Assets and collateral lost
• Disruption of essential public services
• Risk of losing next election
• Sanctions from national government (eligibility for other grants, criminal prosecution etc)
• Repayment of other debts endangered
• Blacklisting by financial institutions
• Ultimate dissolution of local government, forced merger and state supervision
National Government
• Guarantees called, stress on national budget
• International obligations on gross state debt (Maastricht, IMF etc.)
• Bad precedents set in case of repeated bailouts
• Lose value of grants and investments already made if projects are halted midstream
• Service provision obligation may revert to national level (safe drinking water)
• “bad publicity” for entire local government system
• need for policy reform and incipient debate
Lender, vendor, bondholder
• balance sheet losses (value of loans made or bonds held, or accounts receivable written off)
• provisioning and regulatory problems
• cost of managing bad assets
• negative publicity for banks “pressuring” municipalities
• risk of losing entire asset/loan in a workout agreement or liquidation procedure
• lost future business with municipal sector
• cost of maneuvering to shift cost to taxpayer (bank bailouts, selling off loans)
A debt adjustment procedure and restrictions on borrowing were also justified by the risks cited
above.  
Description of Debt Adjustment Process (outline)7
The Hungarian debt adjustment procedure consists of 7 major phases that are as follows: (1)
Initiation of debt adjustment procedure, (2) Court review of the petition, (3) Formulating a debt
adjustment committee, (4) Adoption of budget developed for financial crises, (5) Formulating the
financial reorganization plan and the proposed agreement (6) Debt agreement negotiations, (7)
Asset liquidation if no agreement reached.
Summary of the Debt Adjustment Process.  If a municipality does not pay an acknowledged
obligation to a creditor, vendor or to another party, appearing either as an invoice or a court order to
pay, within 60 days of the due date, the Mayor is obligated to notify the city council and to petition
the court within 8 days.  The court has 15 days to examine the petition and to ask for more
information and corrections.  The Mayor has 8 days to respond to the court’s requests.  If the court
agrees that the municipality is truly in a crisis situation and cannot meet its obligations, it declares
the debt adjustment process’s initiation, and host of obligations are then imposed upon the mayor,
the city council, and a separate set of actions are required of the creditors.  Once the debt adjustment
process begins, no creditors may file suit, and all claims are to be reported to the bankruptcy trustee. 
                                                          
7 Please see translation of the Ministers’ expose (appendix).
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A creditor may also petition the court if a municipality is in default, i.e. more than 60 days late in
paying an obligation.8  The court, at its option, may reject a debt adjustment petition if it determines
that the obligation can easily be met with existing assets and cash flow, thus “false bankruptcies”
can be prevented at least according to the intent of the law.  The Mayor faces strict financial
sanctions as a private person if a debt adjustment process is not initiated due to delays on his part.
Initiation of debt adjustment procedure
If a municipality does not pay an acknowledged obligation to a creditor, vendor or to
another party, appearing either as an invoice or a court order to pay, within 60 days of the due date,
the Mayor is obligated to notify the city council. The representative body shall pass a resolution to
meet the payment obligations or authorizes the mayor to initiate the debt settlement procedure
immediately. 
If the delay on obligations is over 90 days the mayor of the local government has to make a
petition to court and start the procedure of debt adjustment regardless of the approval of the city
council or any committee.
The creditor himself is also entitled to initiate the process but if the creditor initiates the
commencement of the debt settlement procedure, their application must indicate the title and
expiration date (due date) of the local government debt. The documents verifying the claim shall be
enclosed in the application. 
The court shall inform the local government about the submission of the application without
any delay by sending them a copy of the application. The mayor must declare to the court within 15
days of receiving the notification whether the local government acknowledges the situation
described in the application. In the absence of such a declaration it shall be assumed that the
existence of the debt is a fact. 
                                                          
8 See the complete English translation of the Debt Adjustment Law for a more detailed description of the procedure.
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It is important to stress that the creditor can independently decide on the initiation of the
process and put its claim into process. However if he fails to submit those financial claims in due
time outlined in the act, he is entitled to submit them only two years later after the whole procedure
is finished.
Court review of the petition
If the court finds that the conditions of insolvency are met –any financial obligation that is in
delay over 60 days or more - it ordains by virtue of a decree the commencement of the debt
settlement procedure, or else shall terminate the debt settlement procedure.  The declaration by the
court that the debt adjustment process has started means that a legal notice is posted in the
Enterprise Registry, an official document of the court, and public notices are placed in the
appropriate newspapers.  The court simultaneously appoints a trustee, and the municipality has 8
days from inception to form a crisis committee.  The municipality then has 30 days to prepare a
bare bones emergency budget that services only mandatory tasks allowed by the law in case of
financial stress. (see box).   These mandatory services, defined in sectoral laws as well, do not
necessarily have to be performed by the municipality.  The municipality is free to outsource these
services to neighboring towns, to private firms, to NGOs or to an association of municipalities.  The
services regardless of how they are delivered have to be available to residents in a community
undergoing debt adjustment.
Mandatory Services During Debt Adjustment
The Annex to Law XXV (1996) on Municipal Debt Adjustment mandates that a local government only perform the
following tasks upon initiation of debt adjustment, essentially banning optional, non-mandatory, and other services
voluntarily assumed by a municipality. These tasks are defined in various laws and decrees and actually cover hundreds
of sub-tasks, but only a fraction of those required of local governments not in financial distress.
1. Maintaining cemeteries.
2. Providing for chimney sweeping
3. Providing and maintaining septage dumping stations
4. Street cleaning, solid waste removal
5. Protection of natural environment, habitats
6. Provision of drinking water, sewage collection and disposal, flood and groundwater control, run-off control
7. Local road maintenance, snow removal
8. Public lighting
9. Removal of animal carcasses, animal control, removal of diseased animals
10. Protection of fauna and flora
11. Rodent control
12. Fire protection and rescue
13. Provision of kindergartens, elementary schools, and educational facilities for national and ethnic minorities
14. Facilities for handicapped children
15. Dormitories for non-resident students, secondary and vocational education, adult education, basic artistic
training, speech therapy etc.
16. Special educational services for hospitalized children, and handicapped children who cannot be schooled
together with other students etc.
17. Services to evaluate the needs for special education
18. Child and family welfare
19. Basic health care (medical clinic, dental, nursing)
20. Outpatient care
21. Social services, day homes etc.
22. Rehabilitation
23. Access to special rehabilitation services
24. Unemployment compensation, social assistance, public aid etc.
25. Certain national defense and mobilization tasks
26. Civil defense
27. Operating the mayor’s office and the city council (except providing honoraria to city council members)
28. “Workfare” for long term unemployed
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The municipality stops payments on all debts, and finances only the mandatory functions
listed above.  The Trustee examines the legality and legitimacy of all decisions leading to the
financial crisis, and makes recommendations to the court for criminal and civil prosecution, if
needed.  The trustee must co-sign all payments made by the municipality during this period, and all
creditors are notified to file their claims.
The court shall promulgate its non-appealable decree on the commencement of the debt
settlement in the Enterprise Gazette without any delay as a first priority
In its decree ordaining the commencement of the debt settlement procedure the court shall
also appoint the Receiver (also called trustee).
The receiver 
a.) reviews the financial management of the local government and reveals the reasons
underlying the commencement of the debt settlement procedure;
b.) may inspect all documents pertaining to the assets of the local government;
c.) attends public and closed sessions of the local government and the committees - which
have bearing on local government assets - in the capacity of advisor;
d.) may make motions regarding debt settlement, which are to be deliberated by the
representative body or the committee as a first priority on the agenda; 
e.) initiates the collection of the local government’s matured claims;
f.) informs the creditors, at their request, about the local government assets and the debt
settlement procedure;
g.) informs the head of the county/Budapest public administration office if the representative
body does not meet its obligations stipulated by this Act;
h.) within 90 days of the commencement date of the debt settlement, the receiver may, by
filing a claim on behalf of the local government at the court exercising general jurisdiction, contest
contracts and legal statements made by the local government or its budgetary organ within 1 year
before the commencement date of the debt settlement if the subject of the contract or the statement
is a gratuitous alienation of local government assets, or a gratuitous compromise encumbering local
government assets, or a transaction which constitutes an onerous contract. 
From the date of the commencement of the debt settlement onwards the local government
may not:
a.) make decisions through which it incurs additional pecuniary liabilities,
b.) found businesses,
c.) acquire ownership in businesses in commutative contracts
d.) fulfill its financial obligations assumed earlier,
The mayor shall hand over to the receiver within 30 days of the date of the commencement
of the debt settlement:
a.) his/her report on financing and the locally adopted ways of implementing mandatory or
optionally assumed local government duties and excising mandatory or optionally assumed local
government powers;
b.) the inventory of and annual report on local government assets prepared as of one day
before the date of the commencement of the debt settlement which includes, with adequate
justification, the following categories separately: registered assets, assets necessary for performing
and exercising duties and powers required by law, and assets which can be used to meet creditors’
claims,
c.) the draft crisis budget by-law,
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d.) a detailed summary of proceedings in progress at court and state authorities and a
detailed summary of execution proceedings in progress,
e.) contracts regarding local government assets which were concluded within a year before
the date of the commencement of the debt settlement procedure together with statements, made any
time, incurring liabilities with regard to the assets,
f.) detailed information on business organizations operating with the involvement of the
local government,
g.) detailed information on the financial situation, debts and accounts receivable of local
government institutions,
h.) other documents which are needed by the receiver to perform their responsibilities.
Forming a debt adjustment committee
Within 8 days of the commencement date of debt settlement, a debt settlement committee is
set up the membership of which includes the mayor, the notary, the chair of the financial committee
(in the absence of a financial committee a local government representative) and a local government
representative. The receiver shall serve as the committee’s chair. The local government
representative member(s) of the debt settlement committee is elected by the representative body by
a simple majority vote. If none of the representatives undertakes membership in the committee the
debt settlement committee shall be constituted notwithstanding - without a local government
representative. If the debt settlement procedure started because of the insolvency of a health care
institution of the local government the representatives of the National Health Insurance Fund and
the health care institution shall also be committee members.
Adoption of budget developed for financial crises
The notary, the chief notary (henceforward generically: the notary) shall prepare the draft
crisis budget by-law within 30 days of the commencement date of the debt settlement procedure. 
The crisis budget includes - in view of the conditions set by Subsection (3) - the operating
costs of the basic residential services and authority duties. 
If the representative body does not approve the crisis budget by-law within 60 days of the
commencement date of the debt settlement it is incumbent on the receiver to report this fact to the
court which shall ordain the continuation of the debt settlement procedure and turn procedure to
asset liquidation of the debtor.
Formulating the financial reorganization plan and the proposed workout agreement
When the representative body has approved the crisis budget by-law, the debt settlement
committee draws up a reorganization program and drafts and agreement for a compromise in
bankruptcy.
In addition to a detailed description of the financial situation of the local government, the
reorganization program includes proposals regarding the utilization of the assets which may be
involved in the debt settlement as well as proposals for taking various measures to expedite the debt
settlement effort (e. g. through taking loans), also indicating the level of income each of these
measures yields to the local government. 
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In the compromise proposal, the debt settlement committee groups the creditors of the local
government into groups by the amount of the creditors’ claims, the original maturity date of the
claims or by other categories, and the committee may propose different types of compromise for the
different groups with adequate justification.
As the compromise is drafted, the debt settlement committee according to the claim reported
by the creditor inasmuch as judicial proceedings are in progress in order to enforce the claim - takes
creditors with contested claims - into account. 
Subsequent to their preparation, the receiver shall submit for approval the reorganization
program and the compromise proposal to the representative body that has been convened by the
mayor with no more than eight days’ notice. The representative body shall pass a decision at a
closed session, with a qualified majority and voting by name. If the representative body turns down
the reorganization program and the compromise proposal the debt settlement committee shall revise
them. 
If the debt settlement committee does not prepare the reorganization program or the
compromise proposal, or if they are not approved by the representative body within 150 days of the
commencement date of the debt settlement procedure, the receiver informs the creditors thereof the
creditors may prepare a creditors’ compromise plan/compromise plans regarding the settlement of
the local government debts within 30 days of receiving the receiver’s notification. This intention of
theirs shall be communicated by the creditors to the receiver within 8 days of the notification. 
The receiver, at the request of the creditors, shall provide all the information and data
necessary for the preparation of the compromise plan. 
Debt agreement negotiations
The receiver shall send the reorganization program and the compromise proposal approved
by the representative body to all the creditors, and at the same time the receiver invites them to a
conference to negotiate the compromise. The receiver shall forward the invitation complete with its
attachments to the creditors at least 8 days prior to the meeting. Depending on the number of
creditors, creditors may be invited in separate groups to negotiate a compromise in bankruptcy. 
The proceedings of the compromise negotiations shall be recorded in the minutes. Creditors
may attend the compromise conference either personally or through their representatives. The
representatives must verify their capacity of attendance - even without request. Creditors who are
absent may consent to the compromise in bankruptcy in writing, too. If the minutes contain the
compromise in bankruptcy, too, in addition to the two attesters the minutes shall also be signed by
those listed under Subsection 1 of Section 25. 
A compromise in bankruptcy may be concluded if more than half of the creditors having
extant claims at the time the debt settlement procedure starts consent to it, provided that the total
claims of these creditors amount to at least two-thirds of all the reported and uncontested creditors’
claims. If the creditors were divided into groups in the compromise proposal then at least half of the
creditors in a group should consent to the compromise in bankruptcy. 
The compromise in bankruptcy is also applicable to those who have not consented to it, or
have not attended the conference in spite of being duly notified thereof. The compromise in
bankruptcy may not stipulate different conditions for these creditors than for those who have
consented to the compromise in bankruptcy. If the local government has divided the creditors in
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groups already in its compromise proposal the conditions set by the compromise for a group may
not vary within the group.
Asset liquidation phase
If the debt adjustment negotiations fail to reach agreement or neither party makes a debt
agreement plan or the city council fails to develop a crises budget in 60 days the court shall
determine the continuation of the debt settlement procedure according to the rules of the partition of
assets by court. No appeal against such an order is possible.
The receiver
a.) determines the locally applicable forms of how the local government discharges duties
and exercises powers that are required by law;
b.) determines which local government assets and which kinds of support allocated centrally
from the central budget are necessary for discharging the duties described under heading a.),
c.) determines the range of assets that may be involved in the debt settlement procedure.
The receiver submits their report, with adequate justification, on what is included in
Subsection (3) to the court within 30 days of the delivery of the order defined in Subsection (1) and
shall also send it to the local government and all the creditors.
The local government and the creditors may make observations on the receiver’s report at
the court within 15 days of the reception of the report. The court shall send the observations to the
receiver, and gives the receiver 8 days’ notice for responding. At the same time the court sets a date
for a personal hearing as an urgent priority to which it summons the receiver, those who made the
observations and if the observations were not made by the local the government, the local
government, too. The receiver may modify their report in view of the observations received, 
In view of the receiver’s report and the comments made by the local government and those
who submitted the observations, the court approves the receiver’s report in an order or requires the
receiver to write a new report
The assets which may be involved in the debt settlement procedure must be divided among
the creditors in the following way (priority order of settling the claims):
a.) regular emoluments including severance pay for the termination of civil servant or public
employee status;
b.) claims secured with lien, mortgage or caution money up to the value of the pledge,
mortgage or caution money, provided that the security was stipulated at least 6 months prior to the
commencement date of the debt settlement procedure. This constraint is not applicable to the
security of a credit provided in relation to a compromise in bankruptcy concluded in the course of a
previous debt settlement procedure.;
c.) the state’s claims arising from interest payment support provided for a compromise in
bankruptcy concluded in the course of a previous debt settlement procedure, and the amounts of
reimbursable targeted support and further reimbursable central budget support;
d.) social security debts, taxes and public debts that may be collected like taxes;
e.) other claims;
f.) interest claims, default penalties and fees on claims, and charged during the debt
settlement procedure;
The claims of lower priority group creditors shall be settled after the claims of higher
priority group creditors are fully settled.
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The amount available for settling the claims of creditors shall be divided among the
creditors in proportion to their claims, however, the social security debts must first be fully settled
and subsequently the claims of the rest of creditors under the same heading shall be settled in
proportion to their claims.
After the approval order the receiver shall:
a.) within 30 days priorities the creditors’ claims as per the priority order and notifies the
creditors thereof,
b.) within 60 days attempt the public sale of those assets of the local government which may
be involved in the debt settlement procedure at the possible highest market price. The creditors shall
have the right of first refusal in the course of the sale of assets. The 60 days’ period may be
extended. 
Within 30 days after the expiration of the deadline the receiver shall propose the partition of
the assets available for the debt settlement procedure among the creditors. Settling the creditors’
claims can take place by virtue of money or through the transfer of unsold assets to the creditors. In
the latter case it is to be established - corresponding to the priority order of settling the claims and
the ratio of creditors’ claims - in what proportion the creditors shall share the local government
assets.
If no agreement is reached.  In this uncooperative scenario where the debtor and the
creditors cannot come to an agreement 210 days after publication of the debt adjustment notice, or
more than 270 days after non-payment, allowances are made for public auctions of assets, and for
numerous appeals, public notices etc.  In the most difficult situations, the court can request the
Parliament to dissolve the city council and call for new elections.  At this time criminal and civil
prosecution can also take place.  Fortunately most cases since 1996 have ended up with a court-
approved workout agreement, and forced asset liquidation only taken place seven times out of 18
cases.  The entire process, including appeals, and if needed, public auctions of municipal assets, is
set to take place within 270-300 days of initiation, depending on whether each actor, the
municipality, the court and the trustee, uses their full allotment of processing time.  (This statutory
schedule has been confirmed by most of the 18 cases filed and resolved to date).  
The framers of the law were aware of the negative effects of delays and stalling by the legal
representatives of all parties, and built in sanctions and incentives at each stage to a) encourage
quick workout agreements b) support tax increases, rationalizations, and the elimination of “luxury”
spending while guaranteeing the public health and welfare functions required by law,  c) allow for
criminal and civil prosecution of corrupt, fraudulent and reckless decisions to borrow for non-
mandatory purposes that endanger public services.  Since the law was modified in 2001 to include
more possibilities for appeals, several cases have taken much longer than envisioned in the original
law.  Forced liquidations took place in these cases since there was no incentive to reach an
agreement.
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Analysis of Debt Adjustment Cases and Successful Preventive Methods
Actual Court Cases
Analysis of the workings of this law will be broken into two phases.  First, the actual debt
adjustment filings and their resolutions9 will be used to demonstrate both causality as well as
lessons learned from workout negotiations and crisis management.  The second part of this section
focuses on detected prevented municipal financial crises, i.e. will try to demonstrate not just the
regenerative but also the preemptive effects of the law in practice.
The Local Government Law of 1990 included two passages that turned out to be
unenforceable.  One stated that upon the request of creditors the court could declare a municipality
to be in default, the other stated that only mandatory public safety; health and welfare tasks are to
be performed in a financial crisis situation.  The Debt Adjustment Act and amendments to the Local
Government Law clarified and specified these two earlier provisions.  Effective January 1, 1996
prior to passage of the Debt Adjustment Law, a debt service limit was added to the Local
Government Law, which was able to severely constrain the ability of local governments to borrow,
issue guarantees, and otherwise assume contingent liabilities of all sorts.10  These provisions
intended to impose market discipline on both borrowers and lenders while also clarifying the
minimum level of municipal services.  (See box earlier in this document).  
Municipal Debt Adjustment Filings in Hungary, 1996 - 2002
pop. size of debt petition field process end result
1 Bakonszeg 1278 154 million HUF 08. 1996. 03. 1997. liquidation
2 Bátorliget 783 65 million HUF 08. 1996. 03. 1997. workout
agreement
3 Csány 2298 46 million HUF 08. 1996. 04. 1997. workout
agreement
4 Egerszólát 1107 24 million HUF 08. 1996. 04. 1997. workout
agreement
5 Páty 4998 400 million HUF 08. 1996. 01. 1999. liquidation
6 Nágocs 856 123 million HUF 09. 1996. 05. 1997. workout
agreement
7 Kács 654 32 million HUF 12. 1996. 07. 1997. workout
agreement
8 Domaháza 1082 22 million HUF 09. 1997 06. 1998. workout
agreement
9 Somogyudvarhely 1208 31 million HUF 01. 1998. 10. 1998. workout
agreement
10 Sóstófalva 3509 6 million 11. 1998. 12. 1999. workout
agreement
11 Sáta 1391 45 million HUF 02. 1999. 08. 2002. liquidation
12 Sorokpolány 825 11 million HUF 02. 1999. 12. 1999. workout
agreement
13 Csepreg 3333 93 million HUF 03. 1999. 04. 2000. liquidation
14 Somogyfajsz 553 86 million HUF 07. 1999. 09. 2001. liquidation
15 Bakonszeg (2) 1278 60 million HUF 06. 2000. 08. 2001. liquidation 
                                                          
9 This section relies on official bankruptcy court documents published in the Enterprise Gazette, as well as upon news clippings from the Center for
Civic and Municipal Innovation (a USAID project in Hungary 1996-1999).  Data was also collected by Mrs. L. Sashegyi and Barbara Tóth of the
College of Finance and Accounting.  Finally the State Audit Office made available its reports on municipal inspections for the years 1995-1999.
Compliance reports of various County Administrative Offices were also researched for this study.
10 The debt service limit, 70% of own source revenues (local taxes, business income, rental income, dividends, interest etc but not one-off asset sales)
adjusted for operational expenses and existing debt service, was imposed by Decree in March 1995.  Since the Local Government Law has the force
of a constitutional amendment, a 2/3 majority is required to amend it, the formula was added to the law later.  
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16 Gilvánfa 341 26 million HUF 08. 2000.  in progress.
17 Nágocs (2) 856 45 million HUF 08. 2000. 04. 2002. liquidation
18 Atkár 1685 86 million HUF 09. 2001. 08. 2002. workout
agreement
In the 18 cases of municipal debt adjustment declared and processed from July 1996 to the
end of 2002 the law met its objectives.  The bankruptcy trustees were able to supervise emergency
budgets and to reorganize municipal services, while of the 18 cases 10 resulted in workout
agreements that were approved by the court and published in the Enterprise Gazette from 1997 to
2002.
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Case Descriptions
Bakonszeg (pop. 1330).  Located in an impoverished area of Hungary, Bakonszeg engaged in a variety of profit-
seeking business activities in the period 1990-1995.  This included establishing a spa company, guaranteeing the
debts of several other commercial companies, as well as borrowing significant amounts to finance the
construction of a resort village.  In 1995 the State Audit Agency uncovered evidence of fraud and illegal activity,
including the falsification of signatures on municipal guarantees.  The debt adjustment process began soon after
the law came into force.  At that time, there were 154 million forints in creditor claims, with only 2 million
forints in collateral available.  This meant that 1.2% of the debt was covered.  The municipality and the
commercial companies it controlled succeeded in borrowing funds from at least four different financial
institutions within a five-year period.  The village filed for debt adjustment in August 1996.  The bankruptcy
trustee, the creditors’ committee, and the municipality could not come to an agreement; hence the court began to
process the forced liquidation of debts and assets on December 22, 1996.  The liquidation process ended in 1998
upon payment of the trustee.
Bátorliget (pop. 777).  This small village had operational and payments problems throughout 1995, filed for debt
adjustment in August, 1996, as it could not make payments on debts of at least 65 million forints, 41 million of
which was owed to a construction company building public utilities.   The balance was owed to a bank for
financing school construction and to the Interior Ministry that had provided a refundable emergency grant in
1995.  The court approved a workout agreement in March 1997, in which the vendor was paid in full, while the
bank and Interior Ministry’s payments were rescheduled for 2000.  The village has been operating under a deficit
consistently, and has requested additional emergency operating grants ever since.
Csány (pop. 2312).  The village built a natural gas distribution system in 1994.  These led to 46 million forints in
debt that could not be serviced in 1996.  Debt adjustment was requested in August 1996, and the workout
agreement was finalized in February, 1997.  At that time the salvage value of the completed natural gas
distribution system was nearly 50 million forints.  The system was sold and the creditors satisfied.  In April
1997, the case was closed.  The village lost 27 million forints from its balance sheet due to the low price it was
able to get for the gas system.  (Why a village of this size needs piped gas is another matter).  In this case nearly
all of the debt was owed to one bank, thus negotiations were simple.
Egerszólát (pop. 1120).  The village’s natural gas distribution project led directly to default in 1996 on 24
million forints in debt ultimately accepted by the bankruptcy trustee.  The village had 1.7 million forints in cash,
and negotiable assets of about 23 million forints.  The workout agreement called for selling the gas network,
worth 45 million forints, at a 75% discount for 11 million forints.  The local government paid off the debt, but
suffered a loss of 21 million forints on its balance sheet.  The case was closed and approved by the court in April
1997.
Páty  (pop. 4605).  The village of Páty, located in a fast growing semi-rural area near Budapest, engaged in
intensive infrastructure projects starting in 1991 that included natural gas distribution systems, and a sewer
system in 1994.  By 1995 the village faced financial difficulties and its debt neared 600 million forints.  The
1995 budget was in crisis, the village applied for emergency grants, and could not even perform the most
elementary functions since lender intercepted its revenues and simply paid itself first, leaving few funds for basis
tasks.  A the mayor and the administrator were forced to resign due to this and other ambiguous business
activities, hence and entirely new village government was elected in January, 1996.  In January 1996, the village
was 4-5 months overdue in making utilities and other payments as the bank continued to remove funds from the
village’s account.  The State Budgetary and Public Administration Office (Takisz) finally stepped in, and
intercepted all funds flowing to the village from the central government, and this stopped the bank from
depleting the village’s accounts to the detriment of public services.  Of the 600 million in estimated debts, 200
million were owed to the bank, 26 million to the tax office, and 14 million to the Interior Ministry.  Debt
adjustment was initiated in August 1996, with the appointment of a bankruptcy trustee.  Upon further
investigation, of the estimated 600 million in debt the trustee determined that only 400 million forints were
justified and legitimate, and owed to 53 creditors.  The village was only allowed to finance its basic functions,
and no utilities were disconnected.  The village became solvent under the tight supervision of the trustee, and
was able to finance its basic activities (see list earlier in this study).  The court approved the workout agreement
in April 1997, and this started a nearly two-year asset liquidation phase.  The local government held three
auctions to raise funds were the creditors had priority rights to bid.  At first glance it seemed that all creditors
could be paid if the sewage treatment and collection system were sold for about 300 million forints.  But because
of several restrictive laws, assets built in part with state funds could not be sold; therefore, less than half of the
claims could be satisfied.  All creditors were paid in cash or in securities and receivables, and the asset
liquidation phase ended in January 1999.
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Nágocs  (pop. 820).  This village was investigated by the State Audit Office in May, 1995, when it was
determined that the village council had engaged in fraudulent activity, had violated accounting and financial
standards, and had engaged in borrowing to finance non-mandatory profit-seeking activities that causes the
village to default on 123 million forints in debt.  The central government provided emergency assistance to the
village in 1995 and 1996 in the amount of over 25 million forints.  As the debt adjustment law went into effect in
June 1996, the village filed its petition.  Twenty-three creditors submitted claims for 78 million forints in
principal and 45 million forints in interest.  The workout process resulted in 63 million forints of principal claims
being recognized, and the bankruptcy trustee submitted the agreement to the court for approval in April 1997.
Assets that could serve to pay off the debt amounted to only 50 million forints at book value.  Most of these
negotiable assets were formed by industrial land belonging to a defunct shoe factory that could only be sold for
20 million forints.  These funds were proportionately distributed among the creditors.  Other assets to cover the
debt amounted to only 13 million forints.  The court declared the debt adjustment process closed in May 1997,
less than a year after filing.
Kács (pop. 684).  This tiny mountain village, with abundant biomass available and located 15 kilometers from
the nearest gas main, decided to build a natural gas distribution network, and defaulted on its bank loan and
missed other payments to vendors and suppliers as well.  The workout negotiations recognized claims of 32
million forints.  The bank and the Interior Ministry are to be refunded with annual budget allocations by the end
of 1999.  The other creditors were to be repaid from proceeds from selling the natural gas system.  The court
closed the case in July 1997, about seven months after the village filed for debt adjustment.
Domaháza (pop. 1061).  In September 1997 16 million forints in unpaid claims came due, and the mayor
petitioned for debt adjustment.  By December 1997 legitimate claims against the village amounted to 22 million
forints.  The court approved the workout agreement in 1998.
Somogyudvarhely (pop. 1218).  The village borrowed 20 million forints from a bank in 1994 to build a natural
gas system.  The 20 million forints were borrowed despite difficulty in servicing an existing 11 million forint
debt.  After cost cutting measures and tight budgets, the mayor petitioned for debt adjustment in January 1998.
The court approved the workout agreement and the case wound up in October, 1998.
Sóstófalva (pop. 3509). The debt adjustment was started by the local government in November 1998. The village
had 6 million forints debt in this case.  The village-house building led to bankruptcy for this settlement.  The
debt came from loans and from the inability of the municipality to pay the enterprises working on the building.
In this case legal proceedings were started against the major of the village charging with defalcation.  The court
approved the workout agreement in December 1999.  According to the law the creditor who has not reported
their assets may do it two years after the end of the process.  The local government intends to avoid filing the
petition again, that is why the municipality makes negotiations now about 5 million forints debt that remained
from the debt adjustment process.
Sáta (pop. 1391).  The members of the local government filed the debt adjustment petition in February 1999.
The settlement got into debt because of the public utility investments and institution maintenance costs.  The 45
million forints debt of the village was for public utility companies and private enterprises.  The municipality
could offer shares, lands and estates.  Because of the number of persons involved in the affair they could not
compound.  The reason, why the case lasted for three years was the many appeals and negotiations in the court.
Sorokpolány (pop. 825). The local government of Sorokpolány filed for debt adjustment in February 1999.  The
11 million forints debt for the state came from the inadequate interpretation of the law.  After the building of the
natural gas system in the village the local government claimed the VAT, but it was not entitled to do.  The
municipality offered estates, but could not come to an agreement.  Ultimately the case ended with liquidation.
Csepreg (pop. 3333).  The local government of Csepreg filed for debt adjustment in March 1999. The 93 million
forints debt for the state came from the inadequate interpret of the law.  After the building of the natural gas
system in the village the local government claimed the VAT, but it was not entitled to do.  Besides of these the
settlement also had debt for a private creditor, though the small amount (110 thousand forints), it was important
in the case.  This was the reason that they could not reach an agreement before the debt adjustment procedure
(for the state the lands would have been enough, which were offered from the municipality).  So finally the local
government could not come to an agreement, hence the court began the process of the forced liquidation.
Somogyfajsz (pop. 553). The debt adjustment petition was filed in July 1999, by the municipality of this small
village.  The 86 million forints debt for APEH (State Financial Control Office) and TB (National Health Service)
came from illegalities.  Besides of these they had debt for private enterprises as well.  According to the court
judgment the properties of the village - estates, lands, and machines - was converted into money, and distributed
among the creditors.
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Bakonszeg (pop. 1278). The creditors who did not reported their claims for their assets during the debt
adjustment process; they could do it in two years after the end of the first procedure.  Bakonszeg would have
liked to close the debt adjustment procedure finally, so after that the two years had passed they filed again the
petition with the remaining 60 million forints debt in June 2001.  After the first process the budget of the village
became empty, and the village ran out of estates, sources were exhausted so in this time the creditors got a very
small amount of money after the liquidation.
Gilvánfa (pop. 341). This small village is in a disadvantaged region of Hungary.  All residents belong to the
gipsy minority, which generally means that they are under qualified, pour people with different culture from the
majority. In this settlement most of the people live from social aid.  The local government could not solve its
tasks without debts, and all institution in the village has a huge amount of debt for the public utility companies.
The petition was filed for the debt adjustment process in August 2000, by the municipality.  This case is in
progress.
Nágocs (pop. 856). The creditors who did not report their claims for their assets the during the debt adjustment
process, they could do it in two years after the end of the first procedure.  In the case of Nágocs there was a
company that announced its purpose for that, but the application was filed by the local government again in
August 2000.  The village had another debts for the APEH (State Financial Control Office) and the Employment
Center of Somogy County. The settlement should have paid off 40 million forints in this procedure, but it had
only little value estates.  This case was ended by court decision, because the state-owned companies (APEH and
Employment Center of Somogy County) needed judicial decree to account for this huge deficit unquestionably.
The biggest creditor (the Employment Center) got only 171 thousand forints.
Atkár (pop. 1685). The local government initiates the debt adjustment process in September 2001.  The
settlement had 86 million forints debt, of which 83 million was owed to a bank and the rest 3 million to private
creditors.  That was the natural gas project of the village starting in 1994 that caused the default later.  Then the
main contractor took out a loan from a bank, the guarantee was the natural gas system, which was under
construction.  This amount of money could not be paid back.  In the legal proceedings the first judgment of the
county court supported the village, but the supreme court sent back the case with its own observations, and the
second decision ordered to pay back the debt by the municipality.  This legal procedure took six years, while the
debt went through two other banks and arrived to the Hungarian Demand Administrator Stock Company at the
end.  During the debt adjustment process the creditors realized that the local government could only discharge a
little part of their money, so the procedure ended with workout agreement.  The properties of the village was
converted into money and distributed among the creditors, which only 1.7 million forints.
To what extent were claims satisfied?
Data on the satisfaction of claims is only available for 9 of these cases as cited below.
While it appears that workout agreements resulted in 100% payment of creditor claims in a few
cases, and that the liquidation process often ends with zero to 50% satisfaction, this data is not
sufficient to draw general conclusions.  Instead, what may be determinant in predicting or
explaining the extent to which creditor claims were satisfied is the relative size of the property and
assets offered as security versus the size of the loan.  In cases where the size of loan exceeded the
total budget and total assets of a municipality by many factors, it is safe to predict that in either the
workout or liquidation scenario, creditor claims would not be fully satisfied.  In other words,
creditors took risks that were excessive compared to the collateral, security and sources of
repayment offered.  So if the creditors decided not to agree to a voluntary workout arrangement
based upon their assessment of the assets available, then they do not take a great risk by allowing
the process to go into involuntary liquidation.
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Municipality Debt in mil HUF Amount paid to




Atkár 86 2 2 agreement
Bakonszeg (1.) 154 2 1 liquidation
Bakonszeg (2.) 60 0 0 liquidation
Bátorliget 65 65 100 agreement
Csány 46 46 100 agreement
Egerszólát 24 24 100 agreement
Nágocs (1) 123 30 24 agreement
Nágocs (2) 45 0,17 0 liquidation
Páty 400 227 57 liquidation
Why so few formal debt adjustment cases 1996-2002?11
These eighteen cases demonstrate that the debt adjustment process is essentially avoided at
all costs unless the local government has lost its ability to deliver the most fundamental services.  In
all of these cases debt adjustment was requested when fundamental services, such as schools and
health clinics, lost their access to public utilities, and key staff members had to go without pay.  A
local government undergoing debt adjustment does not have access to any construction or
development grants and grant-equivalent subsidies, therefore maintaining potential access to these
funds is another incentive to undergo operational cutbacks, avoiding the debt adjustment process as
a secondary benefit.  Despite significant claims with doubtful sources of repayment, neither vendors
nor banks initiated these debt adjustment processes.  These creditors probably were convinced that
the local government had few negotiable assets available for settling claims, and that operational
cutbacks could not produce a cash flow sufficient for fully satisfying claims that became due after a
period of non-performance.  The small size of each village that has petitioned for debt adjustment
suggests that large infrastructure projects, such as natural gas distribution, and piped sewage
collection, are not just technically but financially unrealistic.  Mayors seek “political rent” by
borrowing to build such projects that neither user fees, local taxes nor capital income on other assets
can finance.  Banks and vendors, of course, at least in the early phases (1994-1996) willingly lent to
such small villages for unfeasible projects since they assumed that the state would step in to rescue
municipalities in default.12  To a certain extent this expectation was rational in that in 1995 the state
did give one-off grants to the four villages listed above that eventually underwent debt adjustment,
and also to a city that managed to avoid debt adjustment through budget cutbacks, tax increases and
the rationalization of its institutional structure.  Pressure for expansion of those one-off grants in
1995 contributed to the formulation and passage of the Debt Adjustment Law. 
                                                          
11 In the first quarter of 1996 before the law was passed, and immediately thereafter, the popular and professional press made claims that 50-100
municipalities would immediately declare bankruptcy.  These claims were not substantiated, neither the Finance nor the Interior Ministry had any
information as to how these numbers were derived.  On the other hand, the emergency operational grants program eventually handled 700-1000
applications (out of a total of 3,200 municipalities) on an annual basis, and one can safely assert that the emergency operational grant system (Önhiki)
is an active form of debt adjustment (bankruptcy) prevention.
12 Banks denominated loans in hard currency in some cases given the 2000 basis point difference between hard currency and forint interest rates in
1994-95, but the borrowers assumed all of the devaluation risk.  Banks also charged 500-1000 basis point premiums above forint securities issued by
the sovereign, despite the expectation that the state would step in if a municipal default took place.
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The Deposits and Credits of the Local Governmental Sector in the Hungarian Banking
System (billion HUF)
Local Governmental SectorThe End of the
period Deposits in Banks Loans from Banks Net Creditor Position Loans/Deposits
.31 December 1995 80.7 49.9 30.8 62%
.31 December 1996 86.8 38.5 48.3 44%
.31 December 1997 115.8 30.3 85.5 26%
.31 December 1998 123.5 44.4 79.1 35%
.31 December 1999 126.1 50.0 76.1 40%
.31 December 2000 148.3 57.6 90.7 39%
.31 December 2001 197.5 73.1 124.4 37%
.30 November 2002* 140.5 97.9 42.6 69%
*Distorted by year-end bonuses, and tax deposits arrive only in December.
          Source: MNB (Hungarian National Bank)
The dearth of municipal bankruptcy or debt adjustment procedures suggests that there may
be effective preventive measures being put in place even in the smallest communities to avoid the
risk of asset liquidation.  It also suggests that since 1996 financial institutions are a lot more prudent
in lending to municipal natural gas and wastewater projects.  As the table indicates, since the
passage of the debt adjustment law, municipalities increased their deposits in the banking sector by
over 227% by the end of 2001, while their loans from banks increased only by 190%.  As net
creditors to the banking system, only 37% of deposits were lent back to the municipalities in 2001,
compared to 62% in 1995, the year some of these restrictions were put into force.  In fact, the
amount of deposits that were lent back to the municipal sector ranged between 26-44% from 1996
to 2001.  The municipal sector has still not regained its position lost in 1995.  Data for 2002 are
tentative, and show a large drop in deposits, with a nearly 32% increase in borrowing over 2001.
But November 2002 data show seasonal distortions since significant transfers take place in
December, and municipalities accumulated 86 billion forints in treasury securities outside the
banking system by that time.  The general tendency that municipalities are net lenders to the
banking system, and borrow about 40% of their deposits (but not total financial assets) since 1996
indicates that after the one-time correction in 1996, the restrictions have not “killed” municipal
borrowing but have stabilized its size in comparison to banking deposits and financial assets.  
Furthermore given a system of deficit grants for covering certain operational deficits, local
governments must cut back non-mandatory and optional activities, rationalize their operations etc.
in order to qualify.13  Of course, deficit grants may only be used to finance mandatory activities that
have been rationalized, and borrowers do not qualify for deficit grants, and these grants may not be
used to finance any kind of debt.
                                                          
13 The emergency grant system, described in paragraph 87 of the 1990 Local Government Law, intends to finance basic services to which the
population is entitled.   Experts close to the process, both within and without the public administration sector, are convinced that the emergency grant
system and the rationalizations it imposes have prevented many debt adjustment situations from taking place.  See World Bank Discussion Paper No.
417, “Hungary:  Modernizing the Subnational Government System,” May 2000, Mihaly Kopanyi et al editors.
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Some Preventive Measures at the City Level
Though the debt adjustment filings to date have all been by villages with populations ranging from 300 to 5000
(average population 1500), cities too have taken measures to avoid default.  Some examples follow:
Tapolca (pop. 18,000)  Tapolca reorganized its city hall, and cut employment by 100 in 1996.  Its entire network of
budgetary institutions was rationalized, including closing kindergartens, and designating new uses for buildings.
Savings were applied to reduce debt and to close gaps in the operational budget.
Komló (pop. 28,000 )  This mining city with high unemployment conducted a performance audit on its institutions in
1995, and reduced its staff by 82 in 1996.  Two institutions were closed, several others were combined.  Capital, labor
and payroll tax costs were applied towards mandatory operations.
Baja (pop. 37,000 )  This city on the Danube faced a rising debt burden and an operational deficit in 1995.  In 1996 it
cut 150 jobs in education and 70 positions were put under hiring freeze in health care.  Several institutions were
completely reorganized or combined with others.  Foundations and associations were formed to take over some the
tasks previously performed by municipal budgetary agencies.  
Preventive Effects of the Law
Capacity and Compliance.   Given the large number of smaller villages who annually
request deficit grants (over 1,200 of 3,200 municipalities sought such funding in 2002, about 1,000
actually qualified), and the low number of actual debt adjustment procedures, other evidence for the
successful preemptive nature of the Debt Adjustment Law can be found in a rarely-cited passage.
Paragraph 18 of the law states that an emergency budget and reorganization plan must analyze
capacity usage figures for institutions that deliver health, social and educational services.
Specifically, an emergency budget cannot fund institutions that are operating at less than half of
their capacity, unless that institution is the only one of its kind in a village.  In other words, villages
with two barely used day care centers must consolidate them, but if the village only has one, it may
keep the facility in the emergency budget.  Another indicator is whether the facilities’ per capita
average cost exceeds the national standards for villages of that type by 30% or not.  There is
anecdotal evidence that these two standards, while found in the Debt Adjustment Law, are being
applied by municipalities in crisis prevention measures.  
In other words political and professional leaders cite this standard when preparing a deficit
grant application, or when taking other steps to prevent default and to continue financing mandatory
tasks. Even if a municipality in financial crisis is not considering filing an emergency operational
grant application with even stricter standards, emergency budget capacity usage standards could be
used to justify politically controversial “preventive” cutbacks in local budgets.  Another explanation
for the low number of actual debt adjustment filings may come from a lack of compliance.  Since
creditors hesitate to petition the court in the hope that they may achieve some type of preemptive
settlement, debtors may chose to ignore the triggering conditions in the law.  Unless the
municipality is randomly selected for inspection by the State Audit Office or another authority, or
are reported with probable cause by a watchdog organization, these failures to invoke the debt
adjustment process will go undetected and unpunished.14
                                                          
14 The State Audit Office in its annual random sectoral compliance (1,000) and comprehensive financial audits (30-50) of municipalities has indicated
that about 10%  of the comprehensive auditees, or 3-5 municipalities per year, should have petitioned for debt adjustment but have not.  Several of the
early filings in 1996 were instigated by State Audit Office inspections in 1995, though the more recent inspections have not forced any new filings as
preventive and compensatory measures are implemented immediately.  These figures should not be projected upon the entire population of
municipalities, but are indicative of the compliance problem.
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Defining “near misses.”  The preventive capability of the Debt Adjustment Law cannot be
ascertained from any register of municipalities in distress.  If a municipality does not apply for a
deficit grant, and the press is quiet about its financial difficulties, then there is no source of reliable
information based upon which to estimate the volume and nature of municipalities in “near distress”
situations.  In general, all municipalities in Hungary have a difficult time balancing their operational
budgets and in maintaining a certain standard of services while keeping the number and extent of
institutions unchanged.  Furthermore, the nonexistence of a centrally located and publicly-
accessible file of municipal budgets, annual financial statements and other forms of disclosure, not
only hinders the capital market but makes guessing the number of near-bankruptcies rather difficult.
The law gives a clear definition of when a municipality must petition for debt adjustment, and under
what circumstances a creditor may file such a petition.  The law however does not define any pre-
debt adjustment disclosure or registry requirement.  Evidence for debt adjustment prevention,
however convincing, is circumstantial and haphazard at the macro level, while individual cases of
municipalities negotiating with creditors and passing difficult budgets with real cutbacks seem to
imply that creditors, and certainly all municipalities, wish to avoid the debt adjustment process.
(including choosing non-compliance as an option…).  Even the level of municipal debt can only be
assembled post-facto from projected figures in budget resolutions, and from annual reports that are
filed 6 months after the close of the calendar year.  Both sources of information are unwieldy for
making predictions in real time about incipient debt service difficulties.  Municipal debt to finance
development projects in and of itself cannot be an indicator of future financial stress unless the
particulars of the project, the balance sheet of the municipality, and its predicted/expected revenue
stream are well known.
Generalizations about preempted cases
Description of financial difficulties.  All the analyzed localities gave quite similar answers to
the question that focused on when and how the financial and economic difficulties began with long
lasting liquidity tension.  Békésszentandrás borrowed to finance its own share of a development
project that did not produce revenues directly, while the town’s institutional structure remained
extensive and overstaffed.  Pay increases were granted for political reasons, and the town nearly
defaulted in the second half of 1996 on its loans.  Tokaj faced similar problems in 1995 when its
large network of institutions employed nearly 10% of the total population of the small city.  Tokaj
was running a large operational deficit caused by overstaffing and the fixed cost of the buildings
and organizations belonging to the city.  The operating deficit ran close to 10% of the total budget
and local services became jeopardized and the city’s accounts payable rose dangerously.  Szerencs
made environmental and infrastructure investments in 1995 using state grants that it had to match
with “own source” funds, i.e. a bank loan.  The loan payments simply exceeded the city’s capacity
to generate free revenue.  The city complained that normative operating grants declined in real
terms, forcing them to use funds otherwise available for debt service to subsidize operating
expenses.  Szécsény began an extensive development program in 1990, financed in part by bank
loans and a variety of state grants.  The development program included the construction of a
telephone system, wastewater treatment and piped gas networks.  The total cost of these networks
was underestimated, and the city had to borrow additional funds to complete the projects.  Higher
interest payments of course placed stress on the budget that tried to finance an oversized and
overstaffed institutional network that was not appropriate for a city of that size.  Nagykőrös decided
to go forward with a city hospital reconstruction project in 1993 despite being awarded a targeted
grant only with a much higher own-source requirement than the addressed grants usually used to
finance these types of projects.  This translated into a larger own source requirement, hence more
borrowing.  By 1995 the city’s interest payments caused a financial crisis.   Tápiószentmárton also
borrowed excessively in 1994 to finance infrastructure projects, and debt service was not in line
with its operating budget nor with its ability to generate capital income.  
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In these “near bankruptcy” situations the most common reason for near default were
borrowings and debt service burdens that exceeded the free financial capacity of local budgets.
These borrowings were coupled with a politically motivated desire to maintain bloated staffing in
numerous institutions (schools, clinics, social welfare facilities) that were operating below capacity
in buildings that are oversized and expensive to maintain.  The flow of normative grants in real or
nominal terms does not explain debt service problems caused by excessive borrowing, or the
oversized projects that do not generate revenue directly, and cannot produce “general economic
benefits” that can be captured and taxed at the local level to finance debt.  
Why are financial services exempted from the  public procurement law?
The terms of these loans, while not a part of this study and considered secret by local governments, most likely do not
reflect the low risk involved in lending to municipalities, and are likely to have excessive interest and non-interest costs
that are not exposed through a public bidding cycle for financing services.  In fact, the Law on Public Procurement15
exempts financial and securities services from the public procurement process, regardless of the cost and size of
financial services involved.  Loans whose interest, service charge and other costs greatly exceed the procurement
threshold for all other goods and services are therefore not put up for bid unless the municipality wishes to do so.  Given
intense competition in the financial sector among Hungary’s 40 plus banks, and an equal number of securities firms
and brokerages, this exemption should be lifted or clarified since it demonstrably causes damage to the Treasury in the
form of deals disadvantageous to local governments.  Since these loans are rarely competed, are negotiated in secret, are
not subject to a public hearing and approval process, and are not disclosed in detail, it is likely that these municipalities
were paying too much for the funds they borrowed, and that factor also lead to their near defaults.  
Typical of these situations were grossly underestimated construction costs and/or oversized
projects that forced municipalities to borrow more than originally intended.  The incipient debt
service costs then put pressure on funds otherwise needed for operating the bloated service delivery
institutions.  In the case of Tokaj and Tápiószentmárton the extensive network of budgetary
agencies led to fiscal crisis, while in the other cases excessive debt service costs triggered the need
to make difficult political decisions.  
Preemptive Methods in Practice
Treasuries and Budget Cuts.  Turning to next step, we analyzed the methods and
interventions that were carried out by distressed local governments so that ultimately court
adjudicated debt adjustment could be avoided.  The following last minute measures addressed
unpaid accounts payable and missed debt service payments.  Tokaj municipality worked out a
multi-step reorganization plan in 1995. First of all an independent consulting firm was retained
conduct an internal audit on the network of institutions and on the policies of city management. The
city actually experienced organizational proliferation but lacked the political will to close down and
merge some of them. Traditional personal relationships impeded effective measures especially
when it came to cancellation of certain positions and jobs within the institutions and offices.  With
580 public employees in the city with 5000 inhabitants, about half the population had an immediate
family member whose salary came from the city budget.  Besides taking decisions and actions to
sharply reduce the labor force and the number of institutions to a normally satisfactory level, the
municipality of Tokaj embarked on merging organizations and institutions with similar fields of
operation.  
                                                          
15 Paragraph 9, section c and d exempt services provided by financial institutions and securities services from the public procurement requirement.
(Law XL, 1995
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Tokaj’s Microtreasury16
There was no sense in operating all the institutions as economically independent units with own bank account, financial
management unit and budget.  The policy of institution operation and financing was changed with the help of the
municipal treasury, i.e. a cash pool. The merged institutions still remained independent in a sense but the number of
bank accounts was reduced and the municipal treasury forced them to carry out financial plans with all revenues and
expenditures monitored and paid by the cash pool.17  Beyond these organizational changes the unpaid accounts payable
and the missed debt service were prolonged through agreements with creditors and suppliers. All the bank loans and
interests were analyzed by date of expiration and were put in a comprehensive liquidity plan. The maturity and interest
payments were matched with the elements of the liquidity plan.  As a result of the effective actions, especially with the
municipal treasury the city managed to pay off its 16 million forint unpaid accounts payable for suppliers within half a
year. All in all the total expenditure of the city and institutions were reduced by 12-13 per cent per year.
An effective management information system was established when working out the new policy of
finance and made it possible to deliver up to date information to the decision-makers of different
levels.
Negotiations with creditors.  In the case of Békésszentandrás the most important action was
an agreement with the bank to reschedule debt payments.  The municipality asked for restructuring
of its debt and the sold some of its securities portfolio and real estate.  Szécsény also had an internal
organizational audit and the outcome resulted in severe saving actions at all levels. The previously
independent budgetary agencies were financially merged with a common financial administration.
Szécsény rescheduled its accounts payable and chose a new financial institution in 1997.  (rather
rare in the municipal sector).  As in Tokaj the local government created a municipal treasury.  The
network of institutions was rationalized through closings and mergers, some of the institutions were
transferred to the county government. In a case when there is no financial capacity to run a certain
public institution, the local governments can either close them or transfer the operation with all
financials to the county government. The county within its authority can either decide to close the
unit or operates it further if there is a countywide need for it. Szerencs also urged a restructuring its
debt and conducted an internal audit.   Szerencs however was recipient of emergency funds that
were distributed in 1995 in compliance with a Government Decree.  The lobbying landslide that
was a consequence of Szerencs’ et al bailout led directly to the formulation of the debt adjustment
law.  The four other municipalities covered by the one-time emergency grant all underwent debt
adjustment as the law came into force in June, 1996.  Tápiószentmárton like all other distressed
local governments adopted saving actions within the city budget and in the institutions as well.  The
measures incorporated labor force and certain municipal service reductions as well.  As a
consequence mandatory tasks are executed with fewer financial sources than before.  The large
village’s financial difficulties continued throughout 1999 but the mayor managed to avoid having to
file for debt adjustment. 
Mandated internal controls and debt monitoring.  Besides spending cutbacks, organizational
reforms, and micro-treasuries, local governments in Hungary have a mandate to set up a system of
internal controls to monitor spending and debt.  The finance committees of city/village councils
have the legal responsibility to act as de facto supervisory boards or controlling bodies.  City
council committees, with a few exceptions have not set up spot checks and routine procedural audits
of the various budgetary agencies within a municipality.  If these committees were to regularly
monitor borrowing limits and debt service, then reports could be issued to the professional staff in a
timely manner.  These reports by city council committees could perhaps detect impending defaults
                                                          
16 About 50 cities and several counties have established micro-treasuries modeled upon the central government’s treasury.  The treasuries in some
cases have little say in budget execution except for actually conducting cash management for all municipal institutions at their instruction.  In the
harder version of micro-treasuries, the cash pool manager actually controls the budgets, revenues, expenditures, liquidity and daily financial
operations of municipal institutions.  In this version institution managers are essentially only responsible for the technical performance of their
organization such as schools, hospitals and social welfare facilities.
17 Prior to this system Tokaj’s institutions with excess cash purchased treasury bills, while other institutions and city hall itself borrowed at high
interest rates for liquidity purposes.  Overall the forgone interest was much less than the interest expense of numerous small liquidity loans, and the
cost of maintaining numerous bank accounts.
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on obligations of any type, including to vendors.  Local governments with budgets above a certain
magnitude are also obligated to have their annual budget reports and financial statements “audited”
by a certified accountant who has special training in budgetary accounting.  However these audits
are limited to compliance and numerical accuracy, and never extend to making recommendations
for improvements, nor are they intended to reveal waste, fraud and abuse.  The “auditor” who
certifies an annual financial statement does not have the right to call a special meeting of the
municipal council in the case of an impending financial crisis.  Municipal councils in general do not
take the reports of finance committees seriously, and seldom provide resources adequate for
genuine internal controlling to take place.  Local governments have an obligation to monitor the
debt and repayment structure of the various budgetary agencies they control.  This is particularly
critical in larger cities with deeply indebted hospitals and health care facilities that are financed by
the social security system.18  These facilities, if in default, also fall under the municipal Debt
Adjustment Law since passage of the 1998 budget law, even though the overwhelming sources of
technical guidance and funds are various components of the social security system and the
ministries responsible for health care.  A majority of local governments do not have a firm grasp of
the debts and accounts payable of not only health care but other budgetary agencies under their
control.  Many municipalities contacted for the purposes of this study first heard of these
monitoring requirements from the research team.19
Municipal-appointed receivers at institutions
In Hungary municipal service providers such as hospitals, could be municipally owned non-
profit corporations, or budgetary agencies.  Institutions, including schools, may have income from
outside the municipal or national budget, such as rental fees they charge for the use of classrooms or
meeting halls.  Though they are budgetary agencies, or a separate legal entity, the municipality has
service obligations laid down by the Law on Local Self-Government, since the founder, owner and
first line supervisory agency is the municipality.  In the Russian context, despite their legal, tax and
accounting status, these municipal institutions are “objects” of the budget.  Elsewhere, such as in
Serbia, they would be called “direct” or “indirect” budget beneficiaries.
The municipal debt adjustment law was modified in 1998 to include municipal hospitals in a
process similar to the one that applies to municipalities overall.  Municipalities may appoint their
own receivers to financially troubled institutions, departments and other service organizations they
control through their budgets.20  These receivers, in theory, could prevent municipal defaults on
debts, payment problems or other financial crisis by essentially taking over the administration of
their  own institutions.  These receivers could go to work in schools and other facilities to prevent
institutional financial difficulties from affecting the guarantees or other obligations of the
municipality acting as owner or founder.  Municipalities did not really use this option in the debt
adjustment act in the case of hospitals that were a large source of financial risk to them.  The law
was modified to include the reorganization, i.e. debt adjustment, of municipal hospitals as a separate
legal entity from municipalities.  As a result, hospital debt adjustment cases caused intervention by
municipalities to prevent a general default.  Instead of the court appointing a trustee to oversee the
municipality, the municipality could appoint a receiver with similar powers to reorganize critical
institutions that could lead to general default by the entire municipality.  The health fund continues
                                                          
18 Municipal hospitals receive operational funding from the social security system based upon a set of national norms.  Technical and health standards
are imposed by ministries, while maintenance and capital improvement, as well as ultimate responsibility for accounts payable and debt lie with the
local government.  Health care reform and financing problems exceed the scope of this study. However, larger cities face a time bomb that could lead
to debt adjustment procedures if these hospitals impose debt and operational burdens that cannot be covered by local budgets.
19 Government Decree 212/1996 (XII. 23) also requires municipalities with institutions in fiscal distress to appoint special commissioners to
essentially take over the operations of these facilities.  With the exception of hospitals, this decree is not being obeyed.  This decree was reinforced in
Government Decree 217/1998 that details the functions and powers of a municipally appointed receiver or trustee, who works to prevent an overall
bankruptcy caused by the institution that may be in trouble.
20 A municipality must appoint its own trustee to a financially troubled institution if its accounts payable that is over 30 days late exceeds 10% of
projected spending, and is not capable of reducing this lateness to below 30 days within a month.  The municipality may impose stricter conditions on
its institutions with lower thresholds if it wishes.
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to pay for the operation of hospitals, but municipalities are expected to cover maintenance,
replacement, amortization and capital investment.  Regardless, the legal obligation to provide
certain health services remains at the municipal level, and consequently the extension of the debt
adjustment law to municipal hospitals independently stimulated the use of receivers appointed by
the municipalities themselves.  
Why did debt cause problems?  General Conclusions about Hungary
Debt accumulation, and debt service problems flow nearly without exception from financing
the own source portion of partially state-financed infrastructure projects in the energy and
environmental sector.  When debt service payments to lenders began to threaten other vendors and
mandatory operations, municipalities applied the debt adjustment law.  Much of debt owed to
vendors is invisible in the form of deferred accounts payable and vendor loans that are packaged in
a series of progress invoices spread over the standard 3 year financing grants.  Thus the extent of
potential debt owed to vendors that may be in default is objectively difficult to determine.  Vendors
and implicit lenders to date have not filed debt adjustment petitions against municipalities out of
fear that their claims would enjoy a lower priority than taxes, wages and other “more important”
obligations.  There still exists a potential for more municipal debt adjustment procedures in the
formal sense if all vendors decided to press valid claims and stopped overlooking overdue accounts
receivable.  All of the problem municipalities examined, including those that underwent debt
adjustment and those who experienced difficulties, had not used the debt service limit calculation
since its imposition predated these borrowings.  After imposition of the debt adjustment law and the
debt service limit there have been no debt adjustment filings for problems predating these
restrictions.  Local governments reported that the county-level accounting and data offices of the
Finance Ministry and private consulting firms were the most helpful in both preventing as well as
providing debt adjustment technical assistance. Most banks and creditors were willing to cooperate
in restructuring the debt since none have ever filed a debt adjustment petition against a municipality
since the law came into force in mid-1996.  
General summary of debt adjustment avoidance methods in municipalities and municipal
institutions.  
• Restructuring of debt and rescheduling of accounts payable with all lenders and vendors; 
• Conscious rationalization and restructuring of the network of institutions aimed at
eliminating parallel functions by closings, mergers or transfers to the county government;
• Establishing a local treasury to reduce short-term borrowing and to capture interest income
across the entire municipal government, including agencies and other budgetary institutions.  
• Labor force reduction at all levels based upon thorough internal performance audits;
• Decrease of optional  (non-mandatory) municipal services;
• Applications for emergency operating grants essentially forces an examination of capacity
usage, per capita costs, as well as the options for associations and notary districts;
• Stricter application of internal controlling and debt monitoring mandates.
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Analysis of Russian Federation proposal for municipal debt adjustment and crisis
intervention
Our research team has had the opportunity to review the English translations of the Russian
Federation’s Budget Code, and a draft act called “On measures for the financial rehabilitation of the
subjects of the Russian Federation and municipalities displaying the signs of insolvency.”  This
effort was supported by discussions and interviews with experts in Moscow during December,
2002.
General Comments:
We acknowledge that the draft act was very much a work in progress, i.e. many discussions
were being held about its content, and what we reviewed should not be considered in any way as
being final.
Overall, the main concern with the draft act was that the concepts of “unpaid bills”
accumulation for current operations, and the flow and stock of debt for capital projects were
discussed in the same act.  The problem of accumulated unpaid bills for operational purposes, or
operational deficits that may be rolled over into the next budget comprise a different set of problems
from debt-induced insolvency.  Settling fiscal crises caused by unpaid current invoices, or
unpredictable fluctuations in taxes and transfer payments should be handled separately from missed
interest and principal payments on long-term loans for capital purposes.
A part of the confusion in the Draft Act is caused by definitional problems in the valid
Budget Code that is in force that defines financial crises and insolvent situations in Article 112.
The first set of specific comments we have stem from concerns we have with the Budget Code, and
with the definitions from the Budget Code that the writers of the Draft Act on Financial
Rehabilitation had to use.
Concerns with the Budget Code:
The following concerns with the Budget Code were identified that affect our views of the
Draft Act.
Article 90 and 100:  Definition of “municipal debt”
This definition includes guarantees issued by a municipality to a third party but excludes:
vendor loans (extended payment terms from suppliers that are really disguised loans), and leasing
arrangements that look like a recurring expense but are actually loans in economic terms.  This
definition also does not mention that a Court can redefine accumulated overdue accounts payable as
involuntary municipal debt.  
Long term (over one year) and short term debt needs to be defined separately, and there
should be no shifting of short-term debt into the next year, that is conversion to long-term debt,
should be discouraged.  Redefining the unpaid bills of Municipal Unitary Enterprises as “debt”
should be spelled out in detail.  Why are long term loans and bonds limited to 10-year terms?
(Some assets have an economic life that exceeds 10 years, such as roads, sewer systems etc.)
Article 107 and 111:  Municipal Debt Limit
Maximum debt service is defined as 15% of total expenditures (why not relate it to
revenues?)  Experience from other transition countries suggests that numerical debt service limits
applied to a restricted set of revenues, such as an operational surplus, (or all revenues) operate better
than stock limits.  On the other hand, the most effective limitation is to restrict the types of revenues
that may be used for debt service, i.e. to ensure that municipalities first provide all of their
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mandated services, then generate operational surpluses to finance investment, including debt
service.  
Article 112:  Exceeding the maximum limit
Paragraph 2:  who monitors whether a municipality violates one of the provisions of Article
111?  Is there “real time” information available?  Who reports to authorities that the 15% limit has
been exceeded?  How would a lender know that a potential borrower has violated one or more
provisions of Article 111?
The definition of financial crisis needs to be clarified, and separated from financial problems
caused by missed or late payments on long-term debt.  Procedures for dealing with unpaid bills, or
the sudden accumulation of unpaid bills within a current budget year should involve a different
process than settling a situation with outside actors such as banks.  In the first case, a majority of
unpaid bills are owed to employees, vendors, tax offices and other parts of the budget system.
Comments on the Draft Law on Financial Rehabilitation:
In general, there are four areas in which the Rehabilitation Law needs improvement.  Firstly,
the definition and separation of the two types of trigger events, i.e. being in crisis versus being
insolvent, need to be clarified.  Crisis situations as defined in the Budget Code and in the
Rehabilitation Act do not necessarily lead to insolvency, and a municipality may be insolvent
regarding a debt payment yet still be a perfect actor on the operations side of the budget.  There are
indications that several levels of the budget system routinely violate the provisions of Article 111-
112 and others, so the issue of equality before the law also emerges.  The second important area of
concern with the draft act is that particularly in the case of insolvency, the Ministry of Finance
official appointed to oversee a crisis budget and the rehabilitation process is most likely in a conflict
of interest situation.  As described by experts in Moscow, municipalities, besides having unpaid
bills, owe most of their other debt to a different level of the budget system, i.e. to the regional or
federal level.  
Our experts strongly disagree with proposed Rehabilitation act’s approach, that is, one
creditor, the regional or federal authorities, having a distinct advantage over other creditors and
vendors in the insolvency scenario.  The third area of concern involves the “slippery” transition
between being in “crisis” and being insolvent if certain debts of municipal enterprises and
institutions are converted from unpaid accounts payable into debt.  The “crisis” category is real and
prevalent that justifies strict intervention and reforms, and perhaps supervision by the Finance
Ministry since public services may be in danger. But this unpaid bills or crisis situation may not
necessarily be caused by irresponsible behavior on the part of the municipality, its vendors and
suppliers.  The reason to deal with the “insolvency” situation in a separate law with an independent
trustee or expert is that in an insolvency situation, someone most likely made a bad or irresponsible
decision. A bank can take an undue risk, or a municipality could borrow in excess of its ability to
generate income to pay back a debt.  In these cases, someone is individually or collectively
responsible, and an independent, perhaps court-supervised procedure is more appropriate than
simply continuing the procedure started while the municipality was only in “crisis.”  In other words,
a distinct “triggering event” and the establishment of responsibility by an independent expert or
authority are recommended.  (All of the debt adjustment cases in Hungary involved bad decisions
by either the creditor or debtor, or both).  
A final problem area with the insolvency section of the draft Rehabilitation act concerns the
principle that 100% of the debt should be repaid, regardless of the cost, effect on the future of the
municipality, and whether the lender (bank) took an undue risk.  If banks can expect 100%
satisfaction of their claims, then essentially they have passed on all risk to the borrower and to the
State if it assists the borrower.  This type of delayed guarantee could have serious consequences for
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the fiscal balance of the entire country.  Instead, any debt adjustment should aim for full satisfaction
of “reasonable” claims, and the risks should be borne by those who took them.  An opportunity for a
negotiated settlement should be given first, and if that does not succeed, then both the debtor and
creditor take a calculated risk in letting an arbitrator, court or other expert decide the extent to
which claims will be satisfied.
Detailed Comments on the Draft Act:
The aim of these comments is to give some critical remarks on the draft law on municipal
rehabilitation. The solvency of localities involves a larger horizon and has significant effect on local
economics i.e. economic power of a certain region or city, the unemployment rate, the ability to
attract foreign and domestic working capital, nature protection and the standard of living.
To put it very simply what are or what can be the goals of this federal act? First of all (1) the
Act should be an important step in moving away from federal or state budget guaranteed loans or
open issues involving future obligations of municipalities and hence should force independent
market actors to cooperate and compromise out of court and find the ways to avoid bankruptcy
using all tools they can; (2) a clear sign to all market actors and a key step in the distinction between
state and local debt obligations by making the localities 100 per cent responsible for the debt they
incur; (3) the Act should serve as a protective bastion for lending institutions and also suppliers
when is comes to solvency problems; (4) the Act should also be a measure to allocate responsibility
and financial burden as well when a municipality goes bankrupt by looking to both the creditor and
the debtor as well. (5) Last but not least the Act should be realistic in a sense that a municipality
should survive and continue its obligatory duties even after the budget recovery proceeding.
Responsibility for insolvency and consequences in a financial sense
According to Article 3 of the draft law, the number one objective of this Act is to protect the
interest of the creditors and ensure the fullest possible satisfaction of their claims. This thesis
favoring lenders unbalances the responsibility cycle.  All the lending institutions must be somehow
and to some extent responsible for their decisions to provide credits to municipalities and therefore
they must be as careful as possible when lending to financially weak localities. 
In most cases one can detect mutual responsibility for budgetary insolvency: on the lender side
when lending without prudential debtor analyses and collateral, plus taking false decisions on the
creditworthiness of the municipalities, and on the debtor side when taking too optimistic business
decisions.
Most important issue: Why guarantee full satisfaction?
At the beginning of this Act and later on in Article 23 (3a) (3b) the plan of settlement simply
guarantees the creditors and lenders the full satisfaction of their claims. One should really think in
terms of proportional satisfaction when it comes to reorganizing the operations of a financially
collapsed local government. This is truly a philosophical issue whether the law differentiates
between responsibilities by judging the debtor and the creditor such that satisfaction might not be
full regardless of the type of the proceeding.  As the Hungarian law on bankruptcy takes this as a
principle that full satisfaction is possible only in cases when through agreement with creditors and
other suppliers the debated debt can be restructured so that nobody takes forced losses. 
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Unnecessary trigger on lending
Just one more remark on full satisfaction, if the law transfers 100 per cent full satisfaction to
market actors especially banks and other lending institutions, their logical reaction will take the
form of strengthening their lending activities regardless of real needs. In global numbers, if the
retail-home savings on national level expand, the commercial banks see an extra option and feel
also a must to expand their lending activities and where else would they turn rather than to best
debtors, local governments. One could see same trends in Hungary before adoption of the act.
Scope of debt and debtor
Different sentences of Article 4 define the debt and debtor but seemingly exclude the
suppliers’ claims, that is, accounts payable. One should bear in mind that an economic actor or local
government can be badly insolvent not only owing to heavy debt but to unpaid suppliers’ bills. A
slight modification is necessary when defining the meaning of debt and debtor. In Hungary and
many transition countries localities embarked on infrastructure investments gas, electricity, sewer
system, landfills and were unable to pay the invoices of suppliers. The claim of suppliers must be
included in the aggregate of total debt.
Recovery proceedings when really not necessary
Article 5 of this Act strictly defines the signs of insolvency and includes all financial
situations when the ratio between the forecasted revenues and total aggregate debt obligation is
below 30 per cent.  This is also a philosophical issue whether force financially solid and still solvent
localities into proceedings. Maybe many of these cases could somehow survive and remain solvent
unless all the investment and banking community anticipates their financial collapse as press
releases and all the proceedings and consequences detailed in Article 9 predestines them to fall
short of their obligations. If a local government or subject can fulfill its obligations even if it is not
easy financially and politically, they should be given a chance to survive by finding hidden
resources or restructuring debt or restructuring its operational labor force. 
In the proceedings there are some illogical steps. Article 9 defines the consequences of the
commencement of the proceedings on recovery. As Article 7 defines the parties who can turn to
arbitration court by issuing a petition.  Upon detecting an insolvent debtor the creditor is given this
chance as well although the steps before the judge decides on the petition –to declare the
municipality insolvent or not – would involve suspension of collections from the debtor. This is the
step a creditor never takes as this stands sharply against its interest.
Consequences detailed in Article 9
Article 9 defines all the measures that take place before (!) the arbitration court decision on
recognizing the debtor as being insolvent.  Some of the detailed steps are very harmful for the
localities.
In detail, if the court decides that the case finally is out of proceedings the suspensions of
budget funds and different types of collections make absolutely no sense ex ante. This will do much
harm for the municipality and there is no compensation for potential losses, getting in higher risk
category in debtor analyses when incurring debt etc.
Some of the measures should be taken right after the positive court decision but not anything
beforehand. This applies to Article 10 as well:  before judgment on solvency the commencement of
the proceedings must be published in the next issue of The Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration
Court of the Russian Federation. The investment community and the population gets information on
some hypothetical issue which is going to proven by an investigation process detailed later on in
Article 11. This is illogical and should be reverse. If the investigation process proves that the case is
truly insolvent, the procedure must start and all the consequences must be applied.
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Examination of the budget of the debtor 
Article 11 (4) states that the creditors’ representative shall be involved in the budget
investigation, which is absolutely against the future interest of the municipalities. There might be
pieces of business information that simply do not belong to anybody else rather than to the local
government itself and making them “public” is against their future interest. Nota bene, the local
government is not yet recognized as insolvent at this moment but all of its business information is
made well available for the creditors. It is also not quite clear how to define at this point in time the
creditors representative as this body is formed only after the creditors’ meeting specified in Article
17.
Critical remarks on the procedures 
According to the draft law there are major steps in the bankruptcy procedure as follows. 
Market actors define the municipality in question as one that is displaying the signs of
insolvency based upon the grounds for commencement of the proceedings and criteria detailed in
Article 6.  (and Articles 111-112 of the Budget Code).
• Market actors – Ministry Of Finance, Financial Body of subject of the Russian Federation,
creditors and the debtor- are given the right to submit a petition to the arbitration court. One
short comment pertains to the phase “The right to submit…” meaning that they have a
chance if they want to but by this it is not obligatory for the debtor! Would any municipality
turn to court if it can lose only rights and not gain anything? How will the creditors get
budgetary information to submit a petition against a municipality with earnings less than 30
per cent of total debt obligations (plus unpaid supplier bills) defined as anticipated
insolvency? Seemingly creditors cannot take anything before realizing the failure of current
debt obligation. Would state or budget agencies push the localities under procedure in the
“case of the 30 per cent revenue limit”?
• Information Presentation phase by budgetary agencies that is due in two weeks.
• Commencement of proceedings defined in Article 8 and judgment on the petition by the
court and appointment of arbitration representative.
• Consequences of the petition and commencement of the proceedings
• Announcement about the commencement in The Bulletin of the Supreme Arbitration Court
• Examination of the Budget and budgetary performance via the auditing committee of the
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. It is strongly recommend to involve
independent auditors.
• Decision of the arbitration court on insolvency or solvency. One remark to this decision.
What are the ratios that will predestine a local government as being insolvent? Are there
any? Are they commonly well known? The court can make a decision only to state the
failure of a due obligation, interest, capital etc. If so, why run the whole examination? The
court simply should see only one thing that is focusing on the failure of due debt obligations
that are agreed and admitted by the debtor. 
• Actions and steps stated in Article 14 based upon the arbitration court decision, until the
plan of rehabilitation comes into force 
• Completing the list of creditors and their claims in Article 15. Relating to the power of the
arbitration representative, it is sharply criticized that one person is given the right to change
the composition and amount of claims of creditors without any type of court decision. If the
federal or state ruling aims to favor some debt types or obligations to certain parties, this
must be clearly defined and made publicly well known otherwise these impacts are set
against clear lending activity and increase banking risks and interests i.e. risk premiums
well.
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• Approval of preliminary list of creditors by arbitration court, and final approval of creditors’
claim.
• Meeting of creditors and forming the committee of creditors
• Development of rehabilitation plan of the insolvent municipality.  In Article 23 (2) the
ruling says that the plan is to be developed by the representatives of the Ministry of Finance
and with the participation of creditors. First of all the principle of subsidiarity is sharply
violated when pushing away the representatives of the debtors. It is the obligation of the
debt party to create a new recovery budget or plan with the supervision of federal
representatives. This article in such a form states a declaration towards the financially
weakened and insolvent locality. When the most relevant party is left out from plan
development, the questioned debtor mentally feels the plan doesn’t reflect its interest and is
suspicious and unwilling to adopt. At some points such an action is standing against the
principle of governing locally. In point (3a) the term validity and in point (3b) plan of
settlement  is defined which are the core points of this Act. The plan takes the aggregate
volume of debt obligation and prescribes a share of 10-30 per cent of the total income
volume that is directed to repay the fullest debt obligation during the validity period. This
way it is clearly stated that all responsibility for insolvency and failure on repayment interest
and capital etc. is on the shoulders of the municipalities. As said before mutual
responsibility as a principle is to be used in such cases. If a lending institution is not
installing credits with the highest possible rate of debtor analyses, is not judging on
creditworthiness of a debtor than all the outcomes are common in such cases even the
financial ones. 
If we take a closer look at the settlement plan and the elements and restrictions of the action
plan detailed in Article 23 we would come to the conclusion that having such burdens regardless of
the causes of insolvency the local economy and the whole local population will suffer and it is
questioned whether it can survive and serve as a local government any more. Having those actions
resulting in capital and investment shortage during the whole period of term validity.
Control over the execution of the plan of rehabilitation
Suggestions on principles:
Instead of the plan defined in Article 23, a new principle is recommended which takes
measures that focus on proportional satisfaction taking into consideration the (a) total debt
obligation plus unpaid and matured suppliers’ bills, (b) total marketable assets and securities, any
type of valued receivables (c) portions of debt obligations. After satisfaction or proportional
satisfaction the municipality gets rid of all debt and other obligations.
• There must be a period given for all the creditors and suppliers and the debtor before the
arbitration court decision to reach an out of court agreement which in case of lack of
agreement is followed by court process.
• The Act should strictly deal with insolvent municipalities and those cases where only
symptoms (“30 per cent income limit cases”) can be detected must be taken away from
scope of the Act.
• Preventive methods should be incorporated into the Act that serve as protection for lending
institutions, which can take form of obligatory yearly audit for municipalities over certain
debt limit and total expenditure.
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• The Act should somehow serve as a legal institution that prevents court run cases and should
focus more sharply on strengthening the necessity of out of court agreement as the process –
with proportional satisfaction- brings less favorable financial positions for all parties.
Conclusions and Implications for Russia
If national regulatory bodies and the constitutional structure of a state do not allow the
competent authorities to directly regulate the ability of subnational units to borrow for capital
projects, then all market players, including municipalities, their vendors and lenders, should have a
clear set of procedures in place to deal with defaults.  If the state chooses to regulate municipal
borrowing out of existence at its discretion on a case by case basis, like Great Britain, or organizes
its task assignments in such a way as to allow (mandate) an intermediate level to perform public
services instead of municipalities (Scandinavian model), then that state does not need a debt
adjustment law since municipal bankruptcies are essentially impossible.  If the State guarantees
municipal borrowings, or acts as a lender directly or through various state-owned intermediary
organizations, then that society most likely does not need a municipal debt adjustment law.  If the
constitutional and political structure allows the state or intermediate level of government to monitor
municipal budgets and borrowing, or if any intermediate or state agency is involved in approving
borrowing, then that serves as an implicit guarantee, and most likely, a municipal debt adjustment
process is not needed.  If the State willingly subsidizes essential public services in the case of fiscal
stress at the local level, then debt adjustment can be avoided.  But this last situation opens up the
limitless unpaid bills problem if the State does not impose strict conditions for assistance to
municipalities undergoing fiscal stress.
These conditions do not apply in Hungary where municipalities face a plethora of tasks,
regardless of size and scale economies that the state agrees to finance based upon national cost
norms.  In a system where municipalities are free to borrow, invest and spend at their own
discretion within certain guidelines, municipalities are themselves quasi-market actors that could
face default due to unfettered freedom and irresponsible decisions.  Public hearings and approval
are not required for municipal borrowings in Hungary, loans are treated as secrets due to bank
secrecy, and financial services are exempt from public procurement standards.  In this secretive, not
necessarily competitive environment, banks are tempted to offer deals that are unfavorable to local
governments.  Since there is no public review, nor approval from any other body than the city
council itself, many misguided loan decisions were made.  Banks could abuse this environment as
well.  
The necessity for a working municipal debt adjustment process depends on all of the above
factors and given the tight regulation and controlled borrowing at the municipal level in most of
Western Europe and in many US states, the Hungarian municipal debt adjustment law is an
anomaly that works rather well in unique environment.  Until task allocation is reformed and local
revenue options increased, the danger of intentional debt adjustment will exist, hence justifying the
continued existence of this legislation.  Given the constitutional and highly politicized nature of the
rights and obligations of local governments in Hungary, it is highly unlikely that a thorough reform
of task allocation and budgetary practices will emerge in Hungary before EU accession expected in
2004.
The debt adjustment law has been criticized for reducing municipal capital borrowing,
though this trend is a result of a host of factors related to infrastructure grants, fiscal restrictions and
many related capacity questions. The actual net lender position of the municipal sector versus the
commercial banks has been rather stable since 1996, the first year the full effect of various
restrictions could be detected.  In a one time shock, bad loans were squeezed from the system by the
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Debt Adjustment Law and prevented by the other restrictions and rationalizations described in this
study.  The law also seems to favor the debtor giving it the option to reschedule debt indefinitely
since creditors are hesitant to file petitions due to the uncertain outcome of workout negotiations or
forced liquidation.  The debt adjustment law has been effective since it is not used as a last step in a
theoretical series of unintentionally related preventive measures, and lenders as well as borrowers
have been forced into more responsible behavior.  Capacity questions, task allocation, the sharing of
revenues, the dearth of the intermediate level of service delivery etc. are related questions that the
debt adjustment law cannot address, only repair situations that went out of control.  
Reaction of lending institutions.  The bank that handles a municipality’s current account is
familiar with its financial status, spending patterns and risk profile.  The existence of the debt
adjustment law and the debt service limit thus limit the most egregious examples of inappropriate
lending, while the lack of true creditworthiness is fully apparent to the lending institutions.
Vendors and competing financial institutions, such as bond underwriters, do not have access to
information of this quality.  Other lenders have indicated that given their conservative collateral
policy, the debt adjustment act is not a factor in making a lending decision.  A risk factor, however,
is legislative redefinition of what funds are available for debt service.  For example, attempts at
equalizing or centralizing the business tax altered the funds available for debt service in a 5 year
fixed interest bond issue organized by a universal bank on behalf of a first tier city from one year to
the next.  Financial institutions have a legitimate fear that the debt adjustment act does not
necessarily protect their interests in a workout negotiation or forced liquidation since negotiable
assets available to settle debts are usually not sufficient, and projects funded do not generate
sufficient revenues on a stand-alone basis.  In contrast to Anglo-Saxon legal systems, loan
covenants in Hungary do not contain provisions for mandatory rate or tax increases to fund debt
service, nor do workout agreements mandate tax and rate increases.  In other words a legitimate
critique of the debt adjustment law is that it fails to fully protect the rights of creditors, especially
those who rely on revenue-generating projects and not liens on property as security.  Another valid
criticism of the system is that the mayor, city council members and senior executive staff cannot be
held personally liable for bad decisions that damage the interests of the community.
Reaction of municipalities.  It is not the existence of the debt adjustment law that prevents
local governments from borrowing for infrastructure projects, rather the dearth of freely available
cash generated either by a project or other local revenues such as tax collections and capital income.
Those who are not creditworthy do not receive bank loans, and the strict prerequisites of the deficit
grant system are forcing staffing and other cutbacks in smaller communities with persistent
operating deficits.  The most vivid reaction of municipalities to the debt adjustment act is evidenced
by the various steps taken to avoid formally filing for debt adjustment.  Given the hesitancy of
lenders and vendors to petition the court, municipalities have leverage to delay defaults and
renegotiate accounts payable within certain limits.  That is, operating loans and deficits cannot be
rolled over from one budget year to the next.  Projects in Hungary are not yet of a sufficient scale to
generate enough revenues to support stand-alone financing, while localities cannot capture the
economic benefits of better infrastructure through ad valorem property taxes to support a general
obligation-type debt structure and the covenants usually used to mitigate risk.  Operating budgets
are under stress hence do not generate surpluses sufficient for large-scale borrowing.  On the other
hand sewage collection and treatment projects for example are of such magnitude in terms of capital
cost that user fees cannot support debt, amortization and operational expenses given the long
economic life of the assets and the short (3-6 year) terms of the usual loans to municipalities.  (the
asset being constructed partially from state funds cannot be offered as collateral as it cannot be sold
off in a liquidation scenario nor privatized for 10 years).
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Some policy issues for further research
• The bookkeeping and accounting, reporting and disclosure requirements applicable to
Hungarian local governments are due for reform. Acting essentially as holding companies,
budgetary agencies, authorities and the ultimate arbiters of local democracy and self-rule, these
accounting and budgetary practices do not capture the complexities of their balance sheets, the
need for separate capital budgeting and the realities of delivering mandatory services.  For
example the debt service limit cannot be truly captured in a balloon payment scenario since the
bookkeeping system does not use accruals, and local governments cannot provision for future
obligations in an accounting (and compliance) sense.  Bad investment decisions and costly debt
obligations could perhaps be avoided through a mandatory public hearing and approval process,
though this conflicts directly with banking secrecy regulations.
• A register of municipal debt, maintained on a real-time basis, as well as other credit bureau-type
information currently monopolized by account holding banks should be made available to
vendors and creditors alike. 
• Examination of the few long-term borrowings (both bank loans and bonds) would reveal how
debt is secured, repayment assured, how funds are used and what risks market players cover.
Such an examination would reveal how existing restrictive regulations are used in practice, and
perhaps suggest reforms to the existing legal and regulatory framework in order to attract more
private capital into the municipal sector.
Annexes:
Annex 1:  Preamble to Debt Adjustment Law
Annex 2:  Hungarian Debt Adjustment Law
Annex 3:  Council of Europe Recommendations on Local Authority Deficits and Debts
